• U.S. policymakers need to energize their engagement with the midtier arms producers fighting for a larger slice of the global arms market. They should look most urgently at Pakistan, whose cost-effective weapons and growing ties to China make it a country of increasing geopolitical importance.

    Islamabad's expanding defense industry, exemplified by its JF-17 fighter jet, has drawn interest[BP1]  from buyers across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Pakistan has demonstrated [BP2] an ability—uncommon among emerging suppliers—to bundle production with training, maintenance, and operational support. Under Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan's armed forces have grown more capable and outward-looking[BP3] , positioning Islamabad as an emerging force in the international arms market.

    Yet while Pakistan expands its defense partnerships across South Asia and beyond, the United States remains largely absent. This is a strategic mistake. The Pentagon should establish a robust defense industrial partnership with Pakistan that uses Islamabad's manufacturing capacity while advancing American interests.

    The strategic rationale is clear. Pakistan sits at the crossroads of South and Central Asia, with deep military relationships across Muslim-majority nations and growing influence in Africa. Its defense sector offers cost-effective platforms that emerging partners can afford, regional production capabilities that reduce supply-chain vulnerabilities, and proven military professionalism. Most importantly, the China factor: Pakistan has long been a bridge between the U.S. and China, since the days of Richard Nixon. China already plays a significant role[BP4]  in Pakistan’s defense sector. The question is not whether Beijing will be present—but whether Washington will have any influence over how Pakistan’s defense industry evolves, exports, and integrates with regional partners. America’s competitive partnership with Pakistan’s growing defense industry should be seen in this light.

    Recent developments underscore the urgency. Pakistan's growing ties with Bangladesh—including discussions[BP5]  about potential JF-17 sales—have alarmed New Delhi. While Indian media outlets criticize [BP6] these developments, the Pentagon should view them as an opportunity to shape defense relationships in a region where U.S. influence has waned since the Afghanistan withdrawal. Rather than ceding this space to China or allowing India-Pakistan tensions to dictate U.S. regional strategy, Washington should engage with both South Asian nations[BP7] [JB8] .

    What should this partnership look like? First, the Defense Department should establish joint production agreements for specific platforms[BP9] [JB10]  where Pakistan has proven capabilities—potentially including trainer aircraft, light attack helicopters, or armored vehicles. These agreements would allow U.S. forces to reduce costs while ensuring interoperability with partner nations[BP11] [JB12]  that operate Pakistani equipment.

    Second, U.S. defense firms should work with Pakistani manufacturers to co-produce components and subsystems. This would give American companies access to lower-cost production while maintaining quality control and creating dependencies that strengthen the bilateral relationship. It would also position the United States as Pakistan's partner of choice for technology transfer and industrial modernization.

    Third, the Pentagon should expand military-to-military cooperation beyond traditional training exchanges. This should include joint exercises focused on defense industrial cooperation, shared maintenance facilities for regional partners, and coordinated defense export strategies that align with U.S. objectives. Defense ministries often exert influence comparable to or greater than foreign ministries, and the United States must use these channels.

    Critics will cite Pakistan's nuclear program and rivalry with India. These are legitimate concerns, but they should not paralyze American strategy. The United States has successfully compartmentalized cooperation with far more problematic partners when strategic interests demanded it. Moreover, deeper defense industrial ties would give Washington greater leverage to address these very concerns.

    It is true that India would naturally object. New Delhi has long viewed Pakistan’s defense relationships through a zero-sum lens, and any expansion of U.S.–Pakistan defense industrial cooperation would generate friction at a moment when Washington is investing heavily in its partnership with India. But U.S. strategy in South Asia cannot be held hostage to bilateral rivalries alone. The United States already manages defense relationships with adversarial partners elsewhere—from Greece and Turkey to Japan and South Korea—by separating regional deterrence from industrial cooperation. India itself has diversified its defense procurement across Russian, French, Israeli, and American suppliers. Washington should expect the same strategic flexibility in return, while remaining transparent with New Delhi about the scope and limits of any cooperation with Islamabad.

    The broader lesson extends beyond Pakistan. As middle-tier defense manufacturers emerge globally, the Pentagon must develop a strategy to engage rather than ignore them. These countries will produce and export weapons regardless of American preferences. The question is whether the United States will shape these developments to advance American interests or stand aside while China builds the defense industrial partnerships that will define the next generation of global security relationships.

    Pakistan's emergence as a defense supplier presents a strategic opportunity the United States cannot afford to miss. By establishing meaningful defense industrial cooperation with Islamabad, the Pentagon can strengthen American influence in South Asia and provide cost-effective options for partner nations, all the while providing a counterweight to China that keeps the region in balance.

    Joe Buccino is a retired U.S. Army colonel who last served as Communications Director for U.S. Central Command.

     [BP1]URL to demonstrate this

     [BP2]URL to demonstrate this

     [BP3]URL to demonstrate this

     [BP4]URL to demonstrate this

     [BP5]URL to demonstrate this

     [BP6]URL to demonstrate this

     [BP7]which ones? Pakistan/India? Or Pakistan/China?

     [JB8]Pakistan and India

     [BP9]Are you saying that the Pentagon would buy Pakistani-made trainer aircraft, light attack helicopters, or armored vehicles? How would you propose to get that past Congress? Or are you proposing something else?

     [JB10]Sorry – the US should develop these agreements with Pakistani partner nations that also partner with the US

     [BP11]Which partner nations would these be?

     [JB12]Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, Jordab

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  • Federal agencies are set to reopen after the House on Tuesday approved a spending package funding those forced to close their doors over the weekend, ending the shutdown less than four days after it began. 

    All but the Homeland Security Department, which will be funded on a stopgap basis through Feb. 13, will now receive their full fiscal 2026 appropriation. Employees across a slew of agencies impacted by partial shutdown were sent home on furlough on Monday, but will now return to work—most likely on Wednesday. 

    The departments of Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, State and Treasury, as well as other related agencies, such as the Office of Personnel Management and the General Services Administration, experienced a funding lapse that began Saturday morning. The Senate approved the spending package on Friday, but the House was on recess and could not act until it returned on Monday. 

    House Democrats declined to provide the votes for an expedited consideration of the bill, leading the partial shutdown to go on for one more day. A procedural vote on Tuesday appeared as though it might fail and derail efforts to reopen the government, but a few Republican holdouts ultimately opted to move the package forward. 

    Ultimately most Democrats voted against the final bill and most Republicans supported it. 

    The Office of Management and Budget on Friday informed agencies a funding lapse would occur and they should initiate shutdown procedures, even as the White House agency expressed hope the partial government closure would be short-lived. Agencies took varying approaches over the weekend and on Monday, leading to some confusion over exactly how employees should proceed. 

    Agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service and much of DHS remained open, either due to alternative funding streams or the nature of their work. The Federal Aviation Administration, HUD and HHS and other agencies cumulatively sent tens of thousands of employees home on furlough. 

    Employees from several agencies told Government Executive they had been told to expect to report to work on Wednesday if the House acted on Tuesday afternoon. Lawmakers included in the bill language guaranteeing furloughed workers will receive back pay. 

    Many of the agencies now funded through September will experience minor cuts to their budgets relative to fiscal 2025, but will avoid the significantly more drastic cuts proposed by President Trump. Government Executive’s analysis of the bills contained in the spending package can be found here, here and here

    Lawmakers will next turn to finding a path forward on full-year funding for DHS, though leaders have already expressed pessimism about reaching a solution before the Feb. 13 deadline. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., has laid out his caucus’ demands for changes at DHS, including the removal of masks by DHS law enforcement personnel, mandated use of body cameras, a requirement for third-party warrants to enter homes, the end of roving patrols in metropolitan areas by Immigration and Customs Enforcement and more uniform restrictions on use of force by federal agents.

    House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., has called some of those requests non-starters.

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  • A new campaign by the Russian-linked group APT28, called Op Neusploit, exploits a Microsoft Office flaw to steal emails for remote control of devices in Ukraine, Slovakia, and Romania.

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  • The rationale behind Golden Dome’s mandate for space-based boost-phase defense made some sense. If orbiting interceptors could hit an enemy missile very early in flight—before it could deploy countermeasures—they would avoid the Achilles’ heel of defense systems that target missiles in midcourse. But now the Pentagon and contractors are proposing to also use space-based interceptors for midcourse defense, which would jack up the cost while defeating the purpose of going to space in the first place.

    Today’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, system and its 44 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California are designed to intercept warheads during their 30-minute travel through space. But in outer space, lightweight decoys follow the same trajectory as the heavier warheads—preventing the defense from identifying and destroying the true warhead. Any country that can build a long-range missile and nuclear warhead can also build decoys and other countermeasures, creating a defensive problem that remains unsolved despite decades of work. As a result, the GMD system would almost certainly be ineffective against an actual attack. 

    One response to this problem is to focus on a different portion of a missile’s flight: its boost phase, when its rocket motors are burning and before it deploys countermeasures. But the boost phase lasts only about three minutes. The only way to station interceptors close enough to every possible launch point in “peer, near-peer, and rogue” countries is to put them in space. 

    And “to station” is a misnomer that conceals the true difficulty and massive resource consumption of creating an effective boost-phase defense. Each interceptor satellite has a very brief time to accelerate to reach a boosting missile, requiring the satellites to be closely spaced to provide a defense without gaps. And because satellites move in orbit, those in position for an intercept will quickly move away and must be replaced by others moving in. (This simulation helps show why.)

    To ensure that at least two interceptors are in position to reach a single attacking missile during its short boost time, the system would need several thousand interceptors in orbit. Defending against a salvo of 10 missiles would require a constellation 10 times that size—that is, tens of thousands of satellites. Defending against a full Russian or Chinese attack would require hundreds of thousands of satellites.

    And that would be for a missile burn time of three minutes. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union demonstrated that they could reduce the burn times of their solid-fueled missiles. If the U.S. deploys a space-based boost-phase system, one should expect Russia, China, and North Korea to work to reduce their burn times enough to effectively eliminate the possibility of boost phase intercepts.

    The practical difficulties of boost-phase intercept have led the Pentagon and some advocates to talk about using space-based systems for midcourse defense instead. This would give the interceptors more time to reach their targets—perhaps 15 minutes, rather than less than three. That would reduce the total number of interceptors needed to have one or two in place to reach a single target in space at any time.

    But this switch would simply return to the first show-stopping problem: countermeasures. These systems cannot distinguish warheads from decoys, regardless of whether the interceptors are based on the ground or in space. Attempting to intercept all the warheads and decoys each missile releases would vastly increase the number of interceptors required in orbit.  

    And it is far more expensive to field a midcourse defense in space. In addition to the costs of building and launching thousands of interceptors, satellites have a limited lifetime, which depends on their altitude. Midcourse interceptors would all need to be replaced roughly every ten years. The cost of building and launching the satellites would come due again and again. 

    The Pentagon appears poised to spend enormous amounts of money only to end up where it started: with an ineffective mid-course defense. Policymakers must beware of the promise of high-priced fixes that solve nothing.

    The authors are physicists and researchers in the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy at MIT.

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  • American munitions makers are working to increase production capacity. Although Congress didn’t much bend to the White House’s last-minute request for a munitions-funding boost, defense executives say it’s enough to persuade them to pour more of their own funds into boosting production, Defense One’s Lauren C. Williams and Thomas Novelly reported Monday. 

    “We've been getting the demand signals from the customer set long before now, whether that's the amount of munitions that have been expended around the world, or just the stock of ammunition,” said Rylan Harris, who leads business development for Northrop Grumman’s armament systems business unit. “We've been seeing those demand signals already, which has helped us focus a lot of our investments in increasing capacity.” Read on, here.

    Related: South Korea’s Hanwha Defense USA announced last week that it will spend $1.3 billion to build a factory at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas to make ingredients for explosives, propellants, and munitions. 

    Mississippi Sen. Roger Wicker, chair of the Armed Services Committee, praised the development. “We need to bring new entrants into the American defense industrial base to increase competition and guard against single sources of supply, particularly on key programs like energetics and munitions. This agreement demonstrates how smart partnerships with allies can expand production against our mutual adversaries while reinforcing our domestic industrial base,” Wicker said in a statement Monday.

    DOD launches science-and-innovation board as the U.S. cuts research. The new Science, Technology, and Innovation Board, which is a merger of the decade-old Defense Innovation Board and the 70-year-old Defense Science Board, is meant to “streamline” the department's approach to the hardest technological and scientific national-security challenges. But it comes on the heels of Trump-administration cuts that could hinder those efforts. Defense One’s Patrick Tucker reports. Story, here.

    Additional industry reading: 


    Welcome to this Tuesday edition of The D Brief, a newsletter focused on developments affecting the future of U.S. national security, brought to you by Ben Watson with Bradley Peniston. It’s more important than ever to stay informed, so we’d like to take a moment to thank you for reading. Share your tips and feedback here. And if you’re not already subscribed, you can do that here. On this day in 1917, the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, which had announced a turn to unrestricted submarine warfare around the British Isles. 

    Deportation nation

    New: Despite months of pleading by far-right influencers and Fox pundits, the U.S. military won’t send active-duty troops to Minnesota after all, the New York Times reported Monday. Airborne soldiers in Alaska and military police in North Carolina had been put on standby to deploy during aggressive ICE raids throughout Minneapolis last month, which triggered weeks of voluminous demonstrations from locals. 

    Trump threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act amid the unrest. But after the deaths of two American citizens at the hands of immigration agents on Jan. 7 and 24, the U.S. military’s Northern Command “quietly ordered the active-duty troops on standby to stand down,” a U.S. official told the Times.

    In Oregon, a 53-year-old man was arrested after asking people at gunpoint if they’re a U.S. citizen. Among other actions along Interstate 5, he reportedly triggered a series of accidents before he was taken into custody by police on Thursday. 

    He shot at one victim. “That first shooting reportedly set off a series of crimes in which [the assailant] asked about another victim’s national loyalties, switched lanes and directions on the freeway, crashed into at least one victim’s vehicle and tried to steal a series of vehicles—including an ambulance that was responding to the scene,” the Roseburg, Oregon, News Review reported Monday. “No one was injured by the shooting, although at least one alleged victim was treated” at a local hospital for injuries from the collision.

    Related reading: 

    Trump 2.0

    A whistleblower complaint alleging wrongdoing by Trump’s intelligence chief has been “stalled” for months, the Wall Street Journal reported Monday. It’s reportedly “locked in a safe” somewhere because it concerns Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and its disclosure could cause “grave damage to national security,” according to an official. 

    “The complaint was filed last May with the intelligence community’s inspector general, according to a November letter that the whistleblower’s lawyer addressed to Gabbard,” the Journal reports, two months after lawmakers were told about the broad contours of the case. That November letter “accused Gabbard’s office of hindering the dissemination of the complaint to lawmakers by failing to provide necessary security guidance on how to do so.” 

    The complaint itself is reportedly “so highly classified that [the whistleblower’s attorney] said he hasn’t been able to view it himself.” A spokesman for Gabbard called the complaint “baseless and politically motivated.” As for the delay, the Journal reports “A representative for the inspector general said the office had determined specific allegations against Gabbard weren’t credible, while it couldn’t reach a determination on others.”

    It’s unclear exactly why the process has stalled for nine months, especially since sensitive facilities for sharing classified intelligence—SCIFs—have been available in Washington for decades. Experts called the delay unprecedented and noted the intelligence community’s “inspector general is generally required to assess whether the complaint is credible within two weeks of receiving it, and share it with lawmakers within another week if it determines it is credible.” That would have been nearly eight months ago. 

    But Gabbard had time to visit Atlanta after an FBI raid on an election center last week, where Trump spoke directly to agents through Gabbard’s phone after they seized ballots from the 2020 election, the New York Times reported Monday. 

    The raid was “extraordinary,” but the phone call “was even further outside the bounds of normal law enforcement procedure” and “a major departure from past practice,” the Times reports. That’s because “Rather than going to senior department or F.B.I. officials, Mr. Trump spoke directly to the frontline agents doing the granular work of a politically sensitive investigation in which he has a large personal stake.”

    Expert reax: “The DNI’s job is intelligence, not domestic law enforcement and Gabbard’s insertion into a federal criminal matter is virtually certain to be in violation of the law,” said Joyce Vance, former U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama. 

    One possible consequence: Trump’s “conversation with the agents would probably become part of an effort to have the case dismissed as a vindictive prosecution.” 

    Experts are also concerned Trump may be planning “to contest the results of this year’s congressional midterms,” the Times reports. Trump fanned the flames of that potential constitutional crisis Monday when he suggested on former FBI Deputy Director Dan Bongino’s podcast “we should take over the voting in at least 15 places” and “Republicans ought to nationalize the voting.” 

    Trump also repeated his conspiratorial, unsupported claims that he won the 2020 election in his conversation Monday with Bongino. “We have states that are so crooked, and they’re counting votes—we have states that I won that show I didn’t win. Now you’re going to see something in Georgia where they were able to get with a court order, the ballots, you’re going to see some interesting things,” Trump said. (Politico and NBC News have more.)

    Worth noting: “Multiple prior investigations—including one at the end of Mr. Trump’s first term by the same F.B.I. office and federal prosecutors working at the time for the Trump-appointed U.S. attorney in Atlanta—found no evidence to support his false claims of significant voter fraud,” the Times added to the bottom of their report about Gabbard’s appearance in Atlanta last week. 

    In still more conflict-of-interest reporting, top UAE officials bought a “secret stake” in Trump’s “fledgling cryptocurrency venture for half a billion dollars” just four days before Trump’s inauguration last January, the Wall Street Journal reported Saturday. “The deal with World Liberty Financial, which hasn’t previously been reported, was signed by Eric Trump, the president’s son.”

    But just a few months later, “the administration committed to give the tiny Gulf monarchy access to around 500,000 of the most advanced AI chips a year—enough to build one of the world’s biggest AI data center clusters…The agreement was widely viewed as a coup for the emirate’s ruling family, overcoming longstanding U.S. national security concerns and allowing the country to compete with the most powerful economies in the world at the cutting edge of AI advances.” 

    But no one had yet publicly known the UAE bought that secret stake on Jan. 16, giving them 49% ownership of Trump’s crypto firm. And as part of that deal, “At least $31 million was also slated to flow to entities affiliated with the family of Steve Witkoff, a World Liberty co-founder who weeks earlier had been named U.S. envoy to the Middle East, the documents said.”

    The deal is “unprecedented in American politics: a foreign government official taking a major ownership stake in an incoming U.S. president’s company,” the Journal writes. 

    Why it matters: “Trump family businesses made $187 MILLION from this deal, and just months later he gave the UAE some of our most top-secret AI tech,” Maryland Democratic Sen. Chris Van Hollen said in a statement. “They are selling our national security to the highest bidder,” he said. “Foreign countries are bribing our president to sell out the American people.”

    Former White House ethics lawyer Ian Bassin: “I used to advise people not to even accept a free cup of coffee from someone who had interests before them. And staff followed those rules. I can’t even find the words to describe the scale of Trump’s corruption here.”

    Developing: Cuba may have only two to three weeks of oil left as Trump works to implement more regime change in the region with another oil blockade, the Financial Times reported Monday. 

    Recall that the White House is hoping to topple Cuba’s leaders by the end of the year, officials recently told the Wall Street Journal. That accounts for the pressure Trump has put on Mexico to halt oil shipments to Cuba, “which it supplied in exchange for medical services from Cuban doctors,” as the Times reported Saturday. Those stopped in early January. Trump signed an executive order last week promising tariffs on any nation that sells oil to Cuba. The Associated Press has a tiny bit more on these developments, reporting Sunday from Air Force One, here

    From the ruins of America’s failed invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Trump’s Venezuela oil plans are following a few legal precedents and creative workarounds learned during those conflicts, argue former State Department counsel Scott Anderson and former Treasury Department official Alex Zerden, writing Monday in Lawfare. 

    After some lengthy rehashing of State Secretary Marco Rubio’s testimony last week before the senate, which we flagged in Thursday’s newsletter, Anderson and Zerden write this in summary: “At its highest level, the contours of the Trump administration’s policy towards Venezuelan assets follow a familiar and reasonable policy logic,” however Trump’s “shameful record of self-enrichment” makes close “scrutiny all the more important, as there is still room in these arrangements for genuine corruption.”

    Analysis: When it comes to Trump’s foreign policy, the president can best be described as a “Predatory Hegemon,” argues Harvard’s Stephen Walt, writing online Tuesday in Foreign Affairs as part of the upcoming March/April issue to be released on Feb. 17. Here’s a loose outline of his argument:

    • “In the bipolar world of the Cold War, the United States acted as a benevolent hegemon toward its close allies in Europe and Asia because American leaders believed their allies’ well-being was essential to containing the Soviet Union.”
    • But “During the unipolar era, the United States succumbed to hubris and became a rather careless and willful hegemon.” Think Iraq and Afghanistan—as Monica Toft explained in our recent Defense One Radio podcast. The global instability from those poorly-executed campaigns “eventually provoked a domestic backlash that helped propel Trump to the White House.” 
    • Now, thanks to Trump’s “growing if misplaced confidence in his own grasp of world affairs,” U.S. power has become “a direct reflection of Trump’s transactional approach to all relationships and his belief that the United States has enormous and enduring leverage over nearly every country in the world.”

    There are many examples of this throughout history, Walt argues. For example, “The desire to extract wealth from colonial possessions was a central ingredient in the Belgian, British, French, Portuguese, and Spanish colonial empires, and similar motives influenced Nazi Germany’s one-sided economic relations with its trading partners in central and eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’s relations with its Warsaw Pact allies.”

    The big problem, he argues: “This strategy is not a coherent, well-thought-out response to the return of multipolarity; in fact, it is exactly the wrong way to act in a world of several great powers” because “predatory hegemony contains the seeds of its own destruction.” After flagging several inflated and inaccurate claims by Trump, Walt warns in closing, “To be sure, the United States is not about to face a vast countervailing coalition or lose its independence—it is too strong and favorably positioned to suffer that fate. It will, however, become poorer, less secure, and less influential than it has been for most living Americans’ lifetimes.” Continue reading, here

    By the way, here’s Trump speaking at a black-tie event Saturday for a club that began meeting in 1913 to celebrate the birthday of the legendarily treasonous Army Gen. Robert E. Lee: “We’re not going to invade Greenland. We’re going to buy it,” Trump told the meeting of CEOs known as the Alfalfa Club, according to the Washington Post

    “It’s never been my intention to make Greenland the 51st state. I want to make Canada the 51st state. Greenland will be the 52nd state. Venezuela can be 53rd,” Trump said. 

    Additional reading:Judge calls Justice Department’s statements on slavery exhibit display ‘dangerous’ and ‘horrifying,’” the Associated Press reported Saturday from Philadelphia. 

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  • Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a now-patched security flaw impacting Ask Gordon, an artificial intelligence (AI) assistant built into Docker Desktop and the Docker Command-Line Interface (CLI), that could be exploited to execute code and exfiltrate sensitive data. The critical vulnerability has been codenamed DockerDash by cybersecurity company Noma Labs. It was addressed by

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  • Most security teams today are buried under tools. Too many dashboards. Too much noise. Not enough real progress. Every vendor promises “complete coverage” or “AI-powered automation,” but inside most SOCs, teams are still overwhelmed, stretched thin, and unsure which tools are truly pulling their weight. The result? Bloated stacks, missed signals, and mounting pressure to do more with less. This

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  • Moltbook is a new social platform where AI agents post and interact while humans observe, raising questions about autonomy, security, and agent behavior.

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  • Threat actors have been observed exploiting a critical security flaw impacting the Metro Development Server in the popular “@react-native-community/cli” npm package. Cybersecurity company VulnCheck said it first observed exploitation of CVE-2025-11953 (aka Metro4Shell) on December 21, 2025. With a CVSS score of 9.8, the vulnerability allows remote unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary

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  • A new GlassWorm-linked supply chain attack abusing the Open VSX Registry, this time via a suspected compromise of a legitimate publisher’s credentials rather than typosquatted packages. The Open VSX security team assessed the activity as consistent with leaked tokens or other unauthorized access to the publishing pipeline, underscoring how stolen developer credentials can be weaponized […]

    The post GlassWorm Infiltrates VSX Extensions With 22,000+ Downloads to Target Developers appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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