• More money to counter drones and attack underground targets is necessary for future fights, the head of U.S. Central Command said on Thursday, as lawmakers praised and grilled the four-star admiral about the war in Iran.

    In his first House Armed Services Committee appearance since the Iran war began, Adm. Brad Cooper said the U.S. military has changed even in the past eight weeks, leaning on LUCAS drones as well as land-attack missiles and finding cheaper ways to fight off Iranian drones and other weapons. 

    But when asked by Rep. John McGuire, R-Va., what additional support was needed, the four-star admiral had a wish list ready.

    “I’d put three things: more electronic warfare, keep counter-UAS on the leading edge—tactics change very quickly—and we need to invest more in hard and deeply buried targets,” Cooper said. “Everybody is going underground.” 

    A CENTCOM spokesperson later told Defense One the CENTCOM commander was referring to munitions that can destroy more hidden and hardened targets. 

    Cooper’s HASC appearance followed his testimony before the Senate last week, when some members criticized the administration’s shifting justifications for the war. Nor wereHouse Democrats reticent to criticize the conflict’s launch and conduct by  the White House.

    Rep. John Garamendi, D-Calif., criticized Cooper and Daniel Zimmerman, the Pentagon’s assistant international security affairs secretary, for the Trump administration’s continued military operations despite an avowed May 5 ceasefire and the legal limits on wars without Congressional approval. Garamendi said that U.S. forces fired on Iranian tankers after the administration said it halted military actions.  

    “It's incredible to me that this department has such disregard for the Congress and the U.S. Constitution, that the U.S. military forces are not still engaged in hostilities and still deployed against the war and ignoring the War Powers Act and the Constitution,” Garamendi said. “The fact of the matter is that hostilities continue.”

    In one exchange, Rep. Seth Moulton, D-Mass., peppered Cooper with rapid-fire questions—including whether the military’s war plan had anticipatedrising gas and oil prices, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the lack of a nuclear deal. 

    “We achieved all our military objectives, we're presently in a ceasefire, we're executing a blockade, and we're prepared for a broad range of contingencies,” Cooper said.

    “Well, it doesn't seem to be going well,” Moulton replied. “And I would like to know, how many more Americans have to ask to die for this mistake?”

    “I think it's an entirely inappropriate statement from you, sir,” Cooper said. “With all due respect.” 

    Other members, such as Rep. Joe Wilson, R-S.C., praised the admiral’s leadership and the “remarkable” military achievements.

    Lawmakers also asked for updates regarding the investigation into the Feb. 28 airstrike on an Iranian girl’s school, which preliminary inquiries reportedly show the U.S. was responsible. 

    Cooper said that investigation “is coming to the end” and said he was committed to releasing an unclassified version to the public.

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  • The Navy’s drone tanker, the MQ-25A Stingray, is cleared for low-rate initial production—just weeks after a production-ready model took its first flight

    “MQ-25 reached Milestone C, which is huge because now we have inflight refueling that is unmanned…it's a great capability,” Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao said at the end of an hourslong Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Tuesday.

      

    The service plans to order three aircraft as part of a Lot 1 contract, which should be awarded later this summer, the Navy said in a news release Tuesday. Priced options for two subsequent lots with a combined eight aircraft are also expected in the contract.

    “Integrating unmanned refueling extends the lethality of our Carrier Strike Groups and equips our force with a decisive advantage to fight and win against any adversary,” Cao posted on X.

    The Stingray, which is launched by catapult, is designed to integrate with aircraft carriers and take over the role currently fulfilled by the F/A-18 Super Hornets. Once in production, it is poised to be the Navy’s first carrier-based aerial drone tanker. 

    “Stingray will provide the Carrier Air Wing with essential organic refueling, allowing more F/A-18E/F aircraft to focus on strike missions,” the service said in the release. “This will expand the operational reach of the air wing while preserving the service life of F/A-18E/Fs, improving readiness across the Super Hornet fleet. The Stingray is also at the forefront of integrating unmanned systems alongside manned platforms within the [carrier air wing].”

    But the program, which plans for 76 aircraft—67 operational and nine test aircraft—has faced significant delays, with watchdog concerns around the production schedule, its effects on costs, and the reliance on a single supplier. The program’s estimated costs have risen about 4 percent, to around $16 billion overall, with each unit costing around $209 million, according to a 2025 Government Accountability Office assessment of Pentagon weapons programs. 

    The Pentagon wants $1.75 billion in 2027 for the MQ-25 Stingray, to fund the “three Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) MQ-25 aircraft and advanced procurement supporting LRIP Lot 3 (five MQ-25 aircraft) long lead materials,” according to budget documents. The money would also be used for the aircraft’s mission control system, or UMCS program, “that builds, integrates, installs, and sustains the systems (control station, communications, and networks) required to operate the MQ-25 and performs ship installations associated with the MQ-25.” 

    The move comes just weeks after a successful two-hour test flight from Boeing’s facility in Southern Illinois. 

    “Boeing is honored to work alongside our U.S. Navy partner in achieving this historic milestone in the MQ-25A Stingray’s development life cycle,” Troy Rutherford, vice president of the Boeing MQ-25 program, said in a statement. “We remain focused on getting this game-changing unmanned aircraft into the hands of the fleet and integrated into the carrier air wing.”

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  • A year after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Army to take on a long list of tasks—including jettisoning unwanted vehicles and aircraft and  re-focusing on unmanned systems—the Army Transformation Initiative is on uncertain ground.

    Hegseth has said he’s giving the document “another look,” but has declined to be more specific, frustrating lawmakers who want a detailed roadmap and timeline they can fund—or not.  

    “We'd like to see a concrete plan on how the Army intends to modernize, where it invests, where the investments will be made, what risks to readiness will be absorbed, and what impact it will have on the industrial base,” Chairman Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., told the Army secretary and acting chief of staff on Friday during a House Armed Services Committee.

    Those comments came three days after the defense secretary acknowledged that ATI might need a revamp.

    The Army always intended ATI to be a living document, a U.S. official told Defense One, but the defense secretary’s office hasn’t reached out to the service to discuss any changes.

    “No plan is designed to survive first contact with the enemy, and as conditions evolve, as things change, we must be willing and able to transform and change quickly with it,” said the official, who was granted anonymity to comment because they were not authorized to speak on the record.

    The Pentagon refused to answer a query from Defense One about which parts of ATI Hegseth would like to revisit, or whether his office had discussed them with the Army.

    Officials instead pointed to the secretary’s May 13 remarks, which included a response to a question from Rep. Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., about the Army’s proposal to slash helicopter procurement. DeLauro’s district includes the Sikorsky factory that manufactures the UH-60 Black Hawk.

    “There are some very good things in the Army Transformation Initiative, and there are some things that we needed to get another look at,” Hegseth said. “And so I think you'll see a review of some of those things, and we’ll get back to you.”

    The conciliatory tone of the response was a departure from Hegseth’s customary ripostes to lawmakers’ questions, especially Democrats’. 

    “I don't know all the depth of what was implied, but I absolutely agree that we will take a hard look with the Office of Secretary of War and make sure that we are synced with their strategy and their plans as they look across the joint force and balance their requirements and needs of the military as a whole,” Army Secretary Dan Driscoll told the House Armed Services Committee on Friday when asked about Hegseth’s remarks.

    Though many of ATI’s items include initiatives the Army had been pursuing for months or years, Hegseth took ownership of the plan by unveiling it in a memo issued last April. The plan quickly drew questions from lawmakers during the Army’s budget hearings last year.

    Many of the questions appear to remain unanswered, as Driscoll and acting Chief of Staff Gen. Christopher LaNeve make the rounds of the armed services and appropriations committees this month. LaNeve is on track to replace the ousted Gen. Randy George, who had relentlessly promoted the Army’s many “transformation” efforts.

    “We want to make sure the Army has done a careful analysis of how transformation will affect our capabilities and force structure,” Rogers said Friday. “We want to understand how the Army intends to sustain the legacy capabilities our service members still need and use. We want to avoid spending this historic influx of money ineffectively and wasting the opportunity to bolster the [defense industrial base].”

    Lawmakers’ questions reflected particular concern about how the Army’s plans to buy fewer aircraft might throttle production lines and supply chains, which can’t necessarily rebound a year or two later if the Army decides it wants to start buying again. 

    “Nobody's saying we don't need Chinooks or Black Hawks or Apaches,” the U.S. official said. “We need to modernize them, etc. But we have so many, based on the force structure side, that we think it’s what is required to fight a conflict.” 

    Instead, service leaders have been told to “tighten their belts,” the official said. So they are  making trade-offs, spending that helicopter money to refill munitions stockpiles and buy, attritable drones, new weapons and cyber capabilities.

    That appears to contradict Hegseth’s congressional testimony May 13, when he announced he wants to restore funding for the Air Force’s E-7 Wedgetail, which was not in the original fiscal year 2027 Pentagon budget request.

    “I think that mindset was indicative of a mindset that we’ve shed, which is the divest-to-invest mindset,” the secretary said.

    Ultimately, final budget decisions go through the White House’s Office of Budget and Management, so the U.S. official couldn’t comment on why the Army is making these specific tradeoffs.

    The service has sent many experts to Capitol Hill to brief lawmakers on ATI, the official said, and will continue to do so. 

    Still, Congress wants more. 

    “What exactly is it that you intend to do? What are the top three or five parts of that initiative?” Rep. Jim Garamendi, D-Calif., asked Friday. “We're going to have to give you the authority—or maybe we disagree and don't want you to go in that direction—but what we're seeing here is enormous inconsistency in direction, and that is not going to suffice as we put together the future direction and laws that the Army is going to have to carry out.”

    A spokesperson for the House Armed Services Committee declined to provide a more detailed example of what lawmakers would like to see on ATI.

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  • AI agent security starts with a simple fact: the more authority an agent has, the tighter its access…

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  • A single remote-controlled Ukrainian ground combat vehicle defended a “key intersection under constant adversary attack” for 45 days last summer, according to a 3rd Army Corps spokesperson who called it “Ukraine’s first fully robotic defensive operation of a position.” It likely won’t be the last.

    The robot—a Droid TW 12.7 armed with a machine gun—and its operator, some 10 kilometers away, “disrupted every attempted breakthrough and prevented enemy infiltration,” with no loss of Ukrainian life, the spokesperson said in a recent interview. 

    As the United States and other militaries work to catch up, Ukraine is putting remote-controlled air and ground systems to uses the world has never seen.

    “Drones in the air provided continuous surveillance” for the operation, the officials said. “They detected enemy movement and transmitted information in real time. Once a threat was confirmed, the operator received the signal and engaged the target with the machine gun.”

    Olena Kryzhanivska, a defense analyst who was first to report on the operation, writes that Ukrainian ground robots now perform 80 percent of logistics tasks on the front lines— from carrying explosives into enemy positions to evacuating the wounded. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense hopes to bring that up to 100 percent.

    Kryzhanivska writes that unmanned ground vehicles, which can cost $10,000 to $30,000, will soon take a much larger role in combat. 

    “There is an expectation that we might see the first encounter between Ukrainian ground drones and Russian ground drones.”

    But practical challenges stand in the way of the fully roboticized front line, the Ukrainian army spokesperson said. 

    “Battery charge is a major factor. There is never enough of it. The main solutions are either installing higher-capacity batteries on the systems or equipping each platform with two to four batteries. The same applies to ammunition load. There is never enough,” one said.

    Another hurdle is the amount of training it takes to produce a ground-robot operator.

    “Planning and executing an operation with an [unmanned ground vehicle or UGV] is significantly more difficult than, for example, operating a UAV, because the number of obstacles is substantially higher,” an official said, adding that it requires a deeper understanding of terrain, navigation, and other nuances that also bedevil self-driving cars. “It is a misconception to think that any UAV pilot can simply sit down and successfully carry out an operation with a UGV.” .

    As autonomy improves, a single soldier might be able to control multiple robots on different missions. But Ukraine limits what its lethal robots can do.

    “Ukrainian forces are still operating in the territories that are populated by civilians. There are children. They are elderly. So just giving ground robots that ability to make decisions, to engage, to strike and kill, that would be a very dangerous development, and Ukrainians are against that,” Kryzhanivska said.

    The Ukrainian officials emphasized that humans will remain part of the decision-making process. 

    “Everything that happens in war must be controlled and coordinated by a soldier. The missions performed by our systems carry a high level of responsibility,” one said.

    Still, new concepts of “predictive intelligence” could enable ground drones to make more decisions as part of a network of sensors and intelligence nodes. They might, for example, predict where or how enemy forces might move in order to get into position.

    It’s a concept that Lt. Col. Eric Sturzinger, who leads research and engagements at the Army’s Artificial Intelligence Integration Center, is exploring via the Tactical Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture, or JEPA—a framework to enable drones to predict how adversaries might plan an attack, potentially making ground robot operations even more effective.

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  • Days after U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran began on Feb. 28, 2026, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez denied American forces the use of the Naval Station Rota and the Morón Air Base – installations that had hosted U.S. troops for more than 70 years.

    “We are a sovereign country that does not wish to take part in illegal wars,” Sánchez said. U.S. President Donald Trump responded by threatening a full trade embargo against Spain.

    Weeks later, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni – Trump’s closest European ally and the only EU head of government invited to his second inauguration – broke publicly with Washington.

    “When we don’t agree, we must say it,” she said. “And this time, we do not agree.” Rome then refused to refuel U.S. bombers at a base in southern Italy.

    These are not minor diplomatic frictions. As a scholar of alliance politics and nuclear security, I see something much larger than a tactical disagreement. The Iran war’s most consequential casualty may not be in Tehran. It may be American credibility as an ally, and with it, the trans-Atlantic alliance itself.

    The Iraq comparison misleads

    The initial U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran were launched with virtually no advance consultation with European allies. The Trump administration treated NATO partners not as participants in strategic decision-making but as logistical infrastructure to be commandeered or punished for refusing assistance.

    European governments, even those most invested with the U.S., declined to join the campaign. The Trump administration has responded with the embargo threat against Spain and the withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany.

    “The U.S.A. will REMEMBER!!!” Trump posted on Truth Social on March 31, 2026.

    The reflex in Washington has been to read this as a rerun of 2003, when France and Germany opposed the Iraq War. In January 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed France and Germany as “old Europe” while courting the postcommunist “new Europe,” including Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

    On the surface, the parallel is tempting: a unilateral American war in the Middle East, European refusal to participate, trans-Atlantic recriminations.

    But the comparison conceals more than it reveals. In 2003, the United States wanted Europe in its coalition. The George W. Bush administration sought United Nations authorization, courted allies and treated European refusal as a problem to be managed.

    In 2026, the Trump administration explicitly does not want European input. It views allies as freeloaders and threatens them with economic coercion. It treats their hesitation as cause for retribution rather than negotiation.

    The deeper difference is structural. In 2003, the trans-Atlantic alliance still rested on shared commitments to collective defense, open trade and an international, rules-based order.

    Today, the Trump administration does not share the commitments that traditionally bound the United States to its European partners, whether on NATO, the Russia-Ukraine war, or the rules governing trade and migration.

    The shared values that papered over the Iraq disagreement in 2003, and that allowed President Nicolas Sarkozy to reintegrate France into NATO’s command by 2009, are no longer there to do the work of repair.

    The April 2026 collapse of Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule in Hungary left Trump without a serious political ally among major European governments.

    The real precedent is Suez

    A more illuminating precedent lies further back. In 1956, Britain and France went to war with Egypt over the Suez Canal, in coordination with Israel, concealing their plans from the Eisenhower administration. Washington responded by threatening to crash the British pound, forcing London and Paris into humiliating retreat.

    The crisis is remembered as the moment Britain accepted that it was no longer an independent great power.

    But its more important legacy was strategic. Suez exposed the depth of Europe’s dependence on the United States. That humiliation drove Charles de Gaulle’s pursuit of an independent French nuclear deterrent. It also accelerated European integration and planted the recognition that genuine strategic autonomy would be a generational project.

    The Iran war inverts the conditions of that lesson. In 1956, Europeans learned that they could not act independently of Washington. In 2026, they are learning that they cannot rely on Washington’s consent being available, and that the U.S. will act without them, against their stated interests and at their economic expense.

    The pattern is the same: Dependence on the U.S. is unsustainable, and autonomous capacity is no longer optional. What has changed is that Europe is now willing to use the financial, economic and military tools it has long possessed in ways it would not have considered before.

    The EU’s €90 billion joint-debt loan to Ukraine signals an autonomous European strategic stance. So do discussions of activating the bloc’s anti-coercion trade instrument against U.S. tariffs, France’s nuclear arsenal expansion and offers to “Europeanize” deterrence.

    The strategic postures were debated for decades. The Iran war is making them operational.

    This is not yet European strategic independence. Europe remains militarily reliant on U.S. air defense, satellite capacity and intelligence.

    The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, for example, has forced an uncomfortable energy reckoning with American liquefied natural gas, Russian pipelines, Middle Eastern hydrocarbons and Chinese-dominated renewable supply chains. None of the available paths to energy security run through trusted partners.

    France and Germany still disagree on nearly every detail of how integration should proceed. But the political condition for autonomy, a shared European belief that Washington can no longer be trusted to share strategic decision-making, has crystallized in a way that no previous crisis produced.

    The post-1945 trans-Atlantic bargain traded U.S. security guarantees for European deference on global strategy. Iraq 2003 strained that bargain. Trump’s first term cracked it, and the Iran war has broken it.

    What replaces it will not be a renewed partnership. It will be a parallel relationship between two powers with sometimes overlapping interests and, increasingly, separate strategic horizons.

    In 1956, Europe learned how dependent it was on Washington. In 2026, it is learning that dependence is no longer sustainable.

    Eleni Lomtatidze, a student in the International Relations Program at the University of Pennsylvania and at SciencesPo Paris, contributed to this story.

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  • Torrance, United States / California, May 19th, 2026, CyberNewswire Criminal IP has announced its return to Infosecurity Europe 2026 with a focus on delivering more actionable, decision-ready intelligence through its continuously evolving platform. Taking place from June 2 to June 4 at ExCeL London, one of Europe’s most influential cybersecurity events will once again bring […]

    The post Criminal IP Returns to Infosecurity Europe 2026 with Advanced AI-Driven TI & ASM appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new ad fraud and malvertising operation dubbed Trapdoor targeting Android device users. The activity, per HUMAN’s Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team, encompassed 455 malicious Android apps and 183 threat actor-owned command-and-control (C2) domains, turning the infrastructure into a pipeline for multi-stage fraud. “Users

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  • Why do maintenance teams struggle? Is it because they lack skills? Or do they need more advanced resources?…

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  • Cybersecurity researchers successfully demonstrated 47 unique zero-day exploits at Pwn2Own Berlin 2026, targeting major enterprise software and AI platforms.

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