• A recently disclosed vulnerability in the Amazon WorkSpaces client for Linux exposes a critical security flaw that could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to user environments due to improper handling of authentication tokens. The issue, tracked as CVE-2025-12779, has prompted urgent action from Amazon Web Services (AWS) and serves as an essential reminder for […]

    The post Amazon WorkSpaces for Linux Vulnerability Exposes Valid Auth Tokens to Attackers appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • Security researchers have uncovered severe remote code execution vulnerabilities in three official Claude Desktop extensions developed and published by Anthropic. The Chrome, iMessage, and Apple Notes connectors, which collectively boast over 350,000 downloads and occupy prominent positions in Claude Desktop’s extension marketplace, all contained the same critical security flaw: unsanitized command injection. The vulnerabilities, confirmed […]

    The post Claude Desktop Hit by Critical RCE Flaws Allowing Remote Code Execution appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • Today, guardians go to space only in popular misconception, but tomorrow? There might be solid tactical reasons to put Space Force personnel in orbit, argues a new report from the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. 

    “The adaptability and flexibility of human decision-making, as well as their ability to conduct a variety of mission operations, could present fundamental challenges to an adversary’s decision calculations,” the report said. 

    Thursday’s report, titled “A Broader Look at Dynamic Space Operations: Creating Multi-Dimensional Dilemmas for Adversaries,” says the Space Force must make all of its systems, not just its satellites, more maneuverable, flexible, and survivable amid China’s rapid push to improve technology for tracking and targeting U.S. military forces. 

    Charles Galbreath, the former Space Force officer and current senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute who wrote the report said putting guardians physically in space may also give the military an advantage. 

    “It is important to remember the fact that the most flexible system ever launched into space by the United States is the human being,” the report said. “Just as human astronauts were essential to the repair of and upgrades to the Hubble Space Telescope and the rescue of several other satellites, guardians in space may be essential for future Space Force missions.”

    The report’s emphasis on making Space Force architecture more dynamic—defined as a strategy of upgrading assets for increased versatility, adaptability, and maneuverability—comes as reports of counter-space weapons increase, from jamming GPS in warzones near Russia to enhanced satellite maneuvering displays by China, according to analysts.

    Repairing and refueling future satellites is a major part of making U.S. assets survivable against adversaries, but the service also needs to update command and control systems on the ground and use Space Force assets like the highly-secretive X-37B spyplane for operational mission instead of experimental ones, according to the report. The report also says putting humans aboard crucial space assets raises the stakes if an enemy decides to strike.

    “There is, of course, another facet of humans in space, which is the potential to raise the threshold of acceptability for hostile actions that may be lethal to humans,” the report said. “Harming an uncrewed satellite is one thing; harming a space station with military crew on it is a completely different risk calculus for an adversary to consider.”

    John Shaw, the former deputy leader of U.S. Space Command, said during a virtual Mitchell Institute event Thursday that he’s been skeptical about putting guardians in space, especially as autonomous abilities become more prevalent. But the retired Space Force officer also noted it’s “inevitable,” and pointed to strategic circumstances where it could make sense.

    “It's probably when we're projecting power across great distances, and it's probably so they can be closer to an intense command and control capability where you need humans in the decision making,” Shaw said.

    While the service has not sent any of its guardians into space for military operations, it has loaned some of its service members to NASA for space exploration. Mike Hopkins became the first guardian in space when he transferred to the service branch from the Air Force aboard the International Space Station in 2020. Space Force Brig. Gen. Nick Hague served as the NASA SpaceX Crew-9 commander and returned from outer space earlier this year after a 171-day mission.

    “I think that the Space Force needs to be thinking about that inevitability and what steps it will take to get there. We can't wake up one day and say, ‘My gosh, we need guardians in space,’” Galbreath said during the event. “We needed to make that decision 10 years ago, because it's going to take that long to develop the pipeline and the training and the capabilities in order to enable that.”

    Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman announced in September at the Air & Space Force Association’s conference that the service is working on a planning document predicting future enemy trends through 2040 that will help officials better acquire key technologies and prioritize missions. Among the items on the service’s wishlist is creating a “live aggressor squadron” that would allow guardians to practice fighting off attacks on satellites. 

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  • NVIDIA has patched a critical vulnerability in its App for Windows that could allow local attackers to execute arbitrary code and escalate privileges on affected systems.

    Tracked as CVE-2025-23358, the flaw exists in the installer component. It poses a significant security risk to Windows users running the application.

    The vulnerability stems from a search path element issue within the NVIDIA App installer, classified under CWE-427.

    An attacker with local access and low privileges can exploit this flaw by manipulating the search path to inject malicious code.

    Vulnerability Details and Technical Impact

    The vulnerability requires user interaction to trigger, but successful exploitation grants complete code execution and allows privilege escalation across the entire system.

    CVE-2025-23358 with a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.2, the vulnerability carries a High severity rating.

    The attack vector is purely local, meaning an attacker must have physical or logical access to the target machine.

    However, the low attack complexity, combined with the ability to escalate privileges, makes this flaw particularly dangerous in multi-user environments and corporate settings.

    NVIDIA App for Windows versions before 11.0.5.260 are vulnerable to this attack. Users running any version before this patch release remain exposed to potential exploitation.

    The company recommends that all affected users immediately download and install version 11.0.5.260 or later from the official NVIDIA App website to mitigate the risk.

    CVE IDAffected ProductSeverityCVSS Score
    CVE-2025-23358NVIDIA App for Windows (all versions prior to 11.0.5.260)High8.2

    This vulnerability underscores the importance of keeping third-party software up to date, even for supplementary applications like NVIDIA’s utility software.

    Attackers frequently target installer components because they often run with elevated privileges during installation.

    To protect your system, download the latest NVIDIA App version from the official NVIDIA App site. The patch directly addresses the search path handling issue and eliminates the code execution vector.

    Organizations managing multiple NVIDIA-equipped workstations should prioritize deploying this update across their infrastructure.

    Security teams should verify their software inventory to identify systems running older NVIDIA App versions and coordinate rapid patching efforts.

    Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X for daily cybersecurity updates. Contact us to feature your stories.

    The post NVIDIA NVApp for Windows Vulnerability Let Attackers Execute Malicious Code appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • A critical vulnerability in Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) could allow remote attackers to crash the system through a crafted sequence of RADIUS requests.

    The flaw CVE-2024-20399, lies in how ISE handles repeated authentication failures from rejected endpoints, creating a denial-of-service condition that forces unexpected system restarts.

    The vulnerability stems from a logic error in the RADIUS configuration that rejects client requests after repeated failures.

    Attackers can exploit this by sending specially crafted RADIUS access request messages targeting MAC addresses already flagged as rejected endpoints.

    Cisco Identity Services Engine Vulnerability

    When ISE processes these malicious requests, the system crashes and restarts unexpectedly, disrupting authentication services across the network.

    This type of attack requires no authentication credentials, making it particularly dangerous for organizations relying on ISE for network access control and endpoint management.

    Cisco ISE versions 3.4.0 through 3.4 Patch 3 are vulnerable by default because the “Reject RADIUS requests from clients with repeated failures” setting is enabled by default in these releases.

    CVE IDProductAffected VersionsCVSS v3.1 ScoreVulnerability Type
    CVE-2024-20399Cisco ISE3.4.0, 3.4 P1, 3.4 P2, 3.4 P37.5Denial of Service (DoS)

    ISE serves as a central point for network access control, device authentication, and compliance policy enforcement.

    When ISE restarts unexpectedly, organizations lose visibility into network activity and may experience authentication failures for legitimate users and devices.

    This cascading effect can disrupt business operations across the entire network infrastructure. Cisco has released multiple options to address this threat.

    Organizations can immediately turn off the vulnerable RADIUS setting in the administration console. However, Cisco recommends re-enabling it once systems are patched.

    ISE version 3.4 systems should be upgraded to Patch 4 or later. Notably, earlier versions (3.3 and below) and newer releases (3.5+) are not affected by this issue.

    Administrators should check their ISE configuration at Administration > System > Settings > Protocols > RADIUS to verify their current status.

    The vulnerability only affects systems with the repeated failures rejection setting enabled, so disabling it provides temporary protection while upgrades are planned.

    Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X for daily cybersecurity updates. Contact us to feature your stories.

    The post Cisco Identity Services Engine Vulnerability Allows Attackers to Restart ISE Unexpectedly appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • As Secretary Pete Hegseth pushes to speed up the development and fielding of new weapons and systems, he should look to a powerful, yet underused tool: modular open systems approach.

    The law already requires MOSA to be used in major warfighting programs “to the maximum extent practicable” and Secretary Hegseth’s own Systems Engineering and Architecture office has been pushing the approach since February. It is direction that, if enforced, could do more to speed acquisitions and cut costs than any process reform under consideration.

    So why hasn't it worked? Because warfighting acquisition, in practice, continues to prioritize closed, proprietary architectures. Program offices lack the expertise and incentives to enforce open standards. Industry resists sharing interface specifications that might invite competition. And without senior leaders demanding MOSA compliance, vendor-locked systems that take decades to upgrade, with every modification requiring costly negotiations with a single contractor continue to be delivered.

    The inability to deliver needed capability on time and at cost helped spawn today's wave of venture-backed defense startups. These companies offer real promise—but if they also build closed product ecosystems, they simply replace one proprietary problem with another. What the Pentagon needs is compliance with an existing framework—MOSA—that enables established primes and new entrants to compete and collaborate.

    Why MOSA works better

    Open architecture means clearly defined interface standards that allow modular hardware or software components—“line replaceable units”—to be independently serviced or upgraded without redesigning entire systems. As with our REMUS unmanned underwater vehicles and Odyssey advanced autonomy, built with open architecture in mind, instead of waiting years for a monolithic upgrade, our customers around the world can service or swap in new capabilities of their choice as threats emerge. An updated software package. A next-generation sensor payload. Integration happens in weeks to months, not decades.

    This isn't just faster initial acquisition. It's continuous modernization across a system's entire lifespan. When threats evolve, the response doesn't require starting a new program of record. It requires competition among multiple vendors to provide the next module. Speed becomes the default, not the exception.

    MOSA also lowers costs. Proprietary components are expensive to maintain and nearly impossible to upgrade without full system redesign. With MOSA standards, multiple vendors compete to provide upgrades. Competition drives down prices and allows for innovation and integration of evolving technology. Obsolescence no longer requires rebuilding from scratch. The savings compound over time as systems remain relevant longer.

    Beyond cost and speed, MOSA solves a fundamental operational problem: interoperability. Realizing the vision of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or CJADC2, is impossible when proprietary interfaces trap data in silos. Open architectures make it easier for platforms, sensors, and command systems to communicate fluidly across services and with allies.

    The advantages go on. In high-threat environments, battlefield systems must be reconfigurable under pressure. Swapping a degraded sensor or integrating a new electronic warfare module becomes a matter of hours, not months. Closed systems crack under stress. Modular systems adapt and keep fighting.

    Modularity also helps defend against cyber attack by enabling rapid remediation of newly discovered vulnerabilities,  reducing the time an adversary has to exploit vulnerable code. Open standards also enable the seamless integration of advanced cyber monitoring, detection, and response capabilities, helping to keep ahead of threats.

    Perhaps most critically, open architectures strengthen the defense industrial base itself. Closed systems concentrate capability in a handful of vendors with opaque supply chains—sometimes relying on foreign parts or foreign-controlled intellectual property. MOSA expands the field, inviting innovation from established primes and agile startups alike. It ensures the Pentagon controls critical data rights and sustainment capabilities, reducing dependence on any single contractor. This is strategic resilience: an innovative, scalable, domestically controlled warfighting ecosystem.

    From policy to practice

    None of this is theoretical. Programs like C5ISR Modular Open Suite of Standards, or CMOSS, prove MOSA works in practice. The legal foundation exists. What's missing is disciplined execution and cultural change.

    To ensure we achieve speed as a principle, every new acquisition should include a MOSA roadmap with defined milestones and enforcement mechanisms. This includes a requirement that non-proprietary interfaces are contractually mandated and flowed down to providers of subsystems and line replaceable units without exception. This requirement will ensure acquisition executives have the tools they need to make the necessary tradeoffs to meet the goals of recent acquisition reforms. To maximize the impact of this effort, Pentagon leaders must also drive industry participation in MOSA consortia (e.g., the Open Mission Systems effort) to develop non-proprietary architectural standards aligned to acquisition milestones. Such consortia are central to the establishment of standards that align industry, promote competition, and innovation. 

    The Secretary’s call to prioritize “speed to capability delivery” is an opportunity to move beyond incremental process reforms and address a key cause of slow, expensive warfighting acquisition: closed, proprietary systems that resist change. Open architecture isn't just good policy—it's the law, and for good reason. It accelerates innovation, reduces costs, enables interoperability, and strengthens industrial resilience. Now we must act to harness it.

    Andy Green is president of HII’s Mission Technologies division. HII, the nation’s largest military shipbuilder, delivers all-domain warfighting solutions to the U.S. Department of War and America’s allies worldwide.

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  • The Russia-aligned Sandworm threat group has intensified its destructive cyberattacks against Ukrainian organizations, deploying sophisticated data wiper malware designed to cripple critical infrastructure and economic operations.

    Unlike traditional cyberespionage campaigns, Sandworm’s recent operations focus exclusively on destruction, targeting governmental entities, energy providers, logistics companies, and the grain sector with malicious tools named ZEROLOT and Sting.

    These attacks aim to weaken Ukraine’s economic stability during an ongoing geopolitical conflict, demonstrating the group’s strategic shift from intelligence gathering to causing maximum disruption.

    The campaign specifically targets critical sectors vital to Ukraine’s economy and national security.

    The threat actor has concentrated efforts on governmental organizations responsible for administrative functions, energy companies managing power infrastructure, logistics operations supporting supply chains, and agricultural entities within the grain sector.

    Welivesecurity security researchers identified this coordinated assault as part of Sandworm’s broader strategy to destabilize Ukrainian operations through permanent data loss.

    The deployment of data wipers represents a dangerous escalation in cyber warfare tactics, as these tools are designed to render systems completely inoperable by permanently erasing data and corrupting file systems.

    Targeted countries and sectors (Source - Welivesecurity)
    Targeted countries and sectors (Source – Welivesecurity)

    The malware operates by exploiting vulnerabilities in target networks through spearphishing campaigns and compromised credentials.

    Once inside the network, ZEROLOT and Sting execute destructive routines that overwrite critical system files, partition tables, and stored data with random values, making recovery virtually impossible without offline backups.

    Wiper Deployment

    The data wipers employ advanced techniques to maximize damage before detection.

    ZEROLOT specifically targets Master Boot Records and file allocation tables, ensuring that operating systems cannot boot after the attack completes.

    The malware includes anti-forensic capabilities that delete event logs and system restore points, eliminating evidence of the intrusion.

    Sting operates with elevated privileges obtained through credential theft and privilege escalation exploits, allowing unrestricted access to protected system areas.

    Both wipers incorporate timing mechanisms that delay execution until achieving maximum network propagation, ensuring widespread impact across connected infrastructure before security teams can respond effectively to the threat.

    Follow us on Google NewsLinkedIn, and X to Get More Instant UpdatesSet CSN as a Preferred Source in Google.

    The post Sandworm Hackers Attacking Ukranian Organizations with Data Wiper Malwares appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • The emergence of advanced AI browsing platforms such as OpenAI’s Atlas and Perplexity’s Comet has created a sophisticated challenge for digital publishers worldwide.

    These tools leverage agentic capabilities designed to execute complex, multistep tasks that fundamentally transform how content is accessed and consumed online.

    Unlike traditional search engines, AI browsers can navigate paywalls and content restrictions with remarkable precision, posing significant risks to publishers’ revenue models and content distribution strategies.

    The attack methodology employed by these systems is particularly concerning because their operational profiles closely resemble legitimate human browser behavior.

    When these agents interact with websites, they present themselves indistinguishably from standard Chrome browser users, effectively circumventing traditional detection mechanisms.

    This behavioral mimicry creates an environment where publishers cannot reliably differentiate between genuine human traffic and automated AI systems without risking legitimate user access disruption.

    Security researchers and journalists at Columbia Journalism Review identified that these AI browsers employ multiple sophisticated techniques to defeat content protection mechanisms.

    The platforms successfully extract full text from subscriber-exclusive articles despite active crawler-blocking protocols and paywalls designed to prevent unauthorized access.

    Understanding Paywall Bypass Mechanisms

    The technical breakdown reveals two distinct approaches used by Atlas and Comet.

    OpenAI’s Atlas was able to retrieve the full text of a subscriber-exclusive article from the MIT Technology Review (Source - CJR)
    OpenAI’s Atlas was able to retrieve the full text of a subscriber-exclusive article from the MIT Technology Review (Source – CJR)

    First, client-side overlay paywalls, commonly used by MIT Technology Review and National Geographic, render content within the browser but hide it visually behind authentication overlays.

    AI agents directly access the underlying DOM elements, reading hidden content invisible to human users.

    Second, when encountering blocked content, these systems employ digital breadcrumb reconstruction—aggregating information from tweets, syndicated versions, and related coverage across the web to reverse-engineer blocked articles.

    This sophisticated technique demonstrates how traditional security measures prove insufficient against determined agentic systems.

    Publishers utilizing server-side paywalls offer marginally better protection, though determined agents continue finding alternative pathways through the digital landscape.

    Follow us on Google NewsLinkedIn, and X to Get More Instant UpdatesSet CSN as a Preferred Source in Google.

    The post AI Browsers Bypass Content PayWall Mimicking as a Human-User appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • The cybersecurity landscape continues to evolve as new ransomware variants emerge from the remnants of previous campaigns.

    Midnight ransomware represents one such development, drawing substantial inspiration from the notorious Babuk ransomware family that first appeared in early 2021.

    Like its predecessor, Midnight employs sophisticated encryption techniques and targeted file selection strategies to maximize damage across infected systems.

    However, what distinguishes this particular strain is the unintentional introduction of cryptographic weaknesses that have created a rare opportunity for victims to recover their data without paying extortion demands.

    The journey from Babuk to Midnight traces back to 2021 when Babuk’s operators suddenly ceased operations and released their complete source code, triggering a cascade of derivative ransomware families.

    GenDigital security analysts and researchers identified Midnight as one such evolution, noting that while the malware retains Babuk’s fundamental architecture, it incorporates modified encryption schemes that inadvertently compromise file protection.

    This discovery proved instrumental in enabling the development of a functional decryptor, transforming what could have been a catastrophic scenario into a recoverable situation for affected organizations.

    Cryptographic Design and Implementation Flaws

    The technical implementation of Midnight reveals the source of its vulnerability. The ransomware employs ChaCha20 for encrypting file contents while utilizing RSA encryption to protect the ChaCha20 keys.

    Critically, the RSA-encrypted key and its corresponding SHA256 hash are appended directly to the end of each encrypted file, maintaining consistent formatting across all known samples.

    This design choice, while simplifying the attack mechanism, creates predictable patterns that security researchers successfully exploited during decryptor development.

    Folder listing showing files with the .Midnight extension (Source - GenDigital)
    Folder listing showing files with the .Midnight extension (Source – GenDigital)

    Midnight demonstrates operational flexibility through command-line arguments that control its behavior. The /e parameter appends file extensions like .Midnight to file content rather than modifying filenames directly.

    The /n argument enables encryption of network-mounted volumes, while –paths=PATHS targets specific directories for selective encryption.

    Early variants prioritized high-value targets including databases, backups, and archives with extensions like .sql, .mdf, .bak, and .dbf.

    More recent iterations have broadened their scope, encrypting nearly all file types except executables such as .exe, .dll, and .msi files.

    Ransom note of .Midnight variant (Source - GenDigital)
    Ransom note of .Midnight variant (Source – GenDigital)

    Affected systems display characteristic indicators including ransom notes titled “How To Restore Your Files.txt,” file extensions of .Midnight or .endpoint, and a mutex named “Mutexisfunnylocal” that prevents multiple malware instances from executing simultaneously.

    Organizations recognizing these signatures can immediately implement containment measures and leverage available decryption tools to restore their systems without capitulating to attacker demands.

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    The post Midnight Ransomware Decrypter Flaws Opens the Door to File Recovery appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • A senior advisor and former deputy to the Pentagon’s undersecretary for policy told senators on Thursday that his office “neither ordered nor even recommended a pause to any weapons shipments to Ukraine” over the summer, contrary to the press reporting from the time, but also in contrast to testimony from his colleague on Tuesday and statements from the Pentagon on July 2.

    For a second day, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee tried to find some clarity on recent Pentagon moves that took both Congress—and in at least one case, the White House—by surprise, during a confirmation hearing that included Alex Velez-Green, who was formally nominated in June to become Elbridge Colby’s deputy.

    “Again, what I am aware of is that there were brief disruptions to delivery of weapons associated with the implementation of the capabilities review that Mr. Parnell was discussing at that time,” Velez-Green said.

    His version of events was different than that of his colleague on Tuesday to the same committee.

    “I'm not aware of any pause in that aid,” Austin Dahmer, who is currently “performing the duties” in the position Velez-Green is nominated for, said during a confirmation hearing for a different Pentagon position. “I think there's been some I'm aware of, a lot of inaccurate reporting in the public on this, but I'm not aware of any pause.”

    Two Pentagon spokespeople did not respond to a request from Defense One for clarification. One of those spokespeople, Sean Parnell, told reporters during a briefing on July 2 that there was indeed a pause to weapons shipments, as a result of a review of weapons stockpiles that had reportedly been recommended by Colby.

    “Proactive engagement from us would have been helpful, at least, to share our side of what we understood to have happened, and that's something I do take on board and if confirmed and committed to addressing in a forthright manner,” Velez-Green said Thursday.

    The lack of clarity over aid to Ukraine is one example of the Pentagon making moves without  coordinating with Congress ahead of time—a trend that lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have publicly derided this week. 

    Republican senators on Tuesday lamented how difficult it is to get in contact with the policy office, with Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton at one point comparing the shop’s lack of communication and coordination to Pigpen, the messy Peanuts character.

    “Do you agree that meaningfully engaging with Congress is necessary for the department to ultimately receive the authorities and the funding that are needed to implement ‘peace through strength?’” Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., asked Velez-Green. “If we do have areas of disagreement —for example, how best to support our allies, our partners—would you agree that a healthy discussion with members of this committee would still be valuable?”

    The lack of notification or coordination on a host of moves, including a review of the AUKUS agreement and the cancelation of a rotational Army deployment to Romania, has led to lawmakers learning about them in the press.

    In some cases, media reports were “the opposite of reality,” Velez-Green said, specifically pointing to a June story from Semafor that reported Colby’s office opposed deploying an additional carrier strike group to the Middle East in support of Operation Midnight Hammer.

    At the time, Parnell told Semafor that Colby was “totally synced up” with the administration.

    More generally, the Pentagon has broken with norms in not consulting members of the Armed Services Committees during the development of the forthcoming National Defense Strategy, a document required by law.

    “I believe we developed that document in direct coordination with the secretary's front office for his direction and intent,” Velez-Green said. “With respect to interagency coordination or notification, there were discussions, but I’m afraid it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to discuss the particulars in this setting.”

    He added that he would provide documentation of those discussions in a classified meeting.

    Sen. Ted Budd, R-N.C., asked Velez-Green to agree that he would personally respond to requests for information from lawmakers, rather than relying on the office of legislative affairs, as a recent Pentagon memo requires for communication between defense officials and Congress.

    “I do quite recognize the frustrations voiced today, as well as earlier this week,” Velez-Green said, after agreeing to communicate personally. “If confirmed, you have my commitment to lean as far forward in engaging proactively with Congress, including on matters of consultation and not just coordination, while doing my part to protect the secretary’s and president's decision space.”

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