• Check Point has disclosed active in-the-wild exploitation of a critical authentication bypass vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-50751, impacting Remote Access VPN and Mobile Access deployments configured with the deprecated IKEv1 key exchange protocol. The flaw, assigned a CVSS score of 9.3, allows unauthenticated attackers to establish VPN sessions without valid credentials by exploiting a logic flaw […]

    The post Check Point VPN Zero-Day Under Active Exploitation by Ransomware Operators appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • A rapidly evolving supply chain campaign dubbed “Shai-Hulud” is targeting developers through malicious Python packages. Researchers have identified 23 newly weaponised PyPI artefacts, expanding the scope of the ongoing Mini Shai-Hulud, Miasma, and Hades malware operations. The latest findings highlight a shift in attacker tradecraft, combining multiple delivery techniques to compromise developer environments, CI/CD pipelines, […]

    The post Shai-Hulud Malware Campaign Abuses 23 PyPI Packages in Developer-Focused Attack appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • Threat actors are increasingly weaponizing the global fascination with large language models and generative AI by impersonating major AI brands ChatGPT, Anthropic’s Claude, DeepSeek, and others to trick users into revealing credentials, payment information, and to install malware. These campaigns are not breaches of the vendor platforms; they are classic social engineering and distribution techniques […]

    The post Hackers Exploit ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek Brands in Credential Phishing Attacks appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • Apache has released HTTP Server version 2.4.68, addressing multiple security vulnerabilities across core modules and widely deployed components, reinforcing the importance of timely patching in internet-facing infrastructure. The update resolves a mix of memory safety issues, privilege escalation flaws, denial-of-service conditions, and input validation weaknesses affecting versions ranging from 2.4.0 through 2.4.67. While several issues […]

    The post Apache HTTP Server 2.4.68 Patches Multiple Security Vulnerabilities appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • President Donald Trump’s choice for acting intelligence director, Bill Pulte, has proved controversial. Pulte’s thin background has sparked resistance from Democrats on Capitol Hill, which is not surprising. But some Republicans too have expressed dismay at the president’s choice, a Trump loyalist who currently runs the Federal Housing Finance Agency. 

    No qualifications,” said U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, a Republican from Texas.

    The current director, Tulsi Gabbard, is leaving the job at the end of June 2026.

    Here’s why it matters who holds the job of director of national intelligence. 

    Principal national security adviser

    To speak of telling truth to power seems terribly old-fashioned these days, but as a veteran of White House intelligence operations, I know that is the essence of the job. 

    The director of national intelligence is the president’s principal adviser on intelligence, though the CIA director has remained somewhat co-equal in that role. In past administrations, the director of national intelligence has been responsible for both the President’s Daily Brief, where the most crucial and sophisticated intelligence is presented, and for the work of the National Intelligence Council

    Most of the President’s Daily Brief items are still done by the CIA, but the DNI or a deputy briefed the president, daily in most administrations but one or two times a week in the first Trump administration. Now, it is not clear the briefings take place.

    The issues in those briefings lean toward the immediate and tactical: What is the situation on the ground in the wars in Iran and Ukraine? If the United States does X, how will the Iranian regime or Russian President Vladimir Putin respond? 

    But intelligence strives to push presidents and their colleagues to think more strategically: What are the implications of hypersonic missiles? What is the trajectory of the relationship between Russia and China? What are China’s geostrategic objectives, and what is the role of the Belt and Road in that vision? What if, far from toppling it, U.S. and Israeli attacks push the Iranian regime to become more hard line, or even produce some “rally ’round the flag” effect among previous opponents of the regime.

    I was chair of the National Intelligence Council from 2014 to 2017, providing day-to-day intelligence support to the National Security Council and its committees, as well as trying to find time to do more strategic intelligence, looking at trends and connections across issues, producing what are called National Intelligence Estimates. 

    The director of national intelligence, known as the DNI, sits atop the 17 agencies that make up what is called the intelligence community. The director neither runs those agencies nor has full control of their budgets.

    Rather, the director of national intelligence coordinates them, which sometimes seems like the proverbial herding of cats. They assemble a combined budget for intelligence, but many of the big agencies, such as the National Security Agency, which intercepts signals, belong to the Pentagon. 

    The creation of the director of national intelligence position was a direct result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 

    The 9/11 Commission report was vividly damning about failures between agencies in the run-up to 9/11. In meetings in New York that summer, CIA and FBI officers were literally unsure what they could tell each other: The former wondered whether the FBI people were really cleared to hear this, while the latter feared that talking might blow a case they were working on. That lack of coordination played a role in letting the plotters slip through intelligence, often in plain sight. 

    The result of the commission’s work was the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which created the director of national intelligence position. 

    Before that, the director of central intelligence wore two hats, as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and loose coordinator of the broader intelligence community. Hardly surprisingly, directors of central intelligence spent most of their time running the CIA, for that was the source of their troops – and their troubles when they arose. 

    score of panels over 50 years had recommended breaking the director of central intelligence’s conflict of interest – coordinating agencies and their budgets while running one of them – and creating a director of national intelligence position. 

    James Clapper, the director of national intelligence for whom I worked as chair of the National Intelligence Council, constantly emphasized “integration.” Across agencies, integration mostly means talking to each other and sharing information. This works against the natural tendency to scoop your colleagues. 

    Across disciplines, integration means better aligning what information intelligence agencies collect with what analysts need. 

    How integration works

    If presidents want to know what the CIA thinks about a particular issue, they can simply ask. Usually, though, the question is what does the intelligence community think, and then the question goes to the National Intelligence Council, the director of national intelligence’s interagency group for intelligence analysis. 

    The National Intelligence Council is organized like the State Department, with officers for regions and functions. Once a question has been presented, the relevant national intelligence officer will convene his or her colleagues from the other agencies. They will argue about the answer to the question, a process sweetly called “coordination,” then agree on the answer. If need be, the process can be done in a few hours. 

    Major strategic analyses – national intelligence estimates – like one done in 2022 on the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic out to 2026, may take months. In all cases, though, the analysis carefully records where there are differences of view in the intelligence community.

    In my last year chairing the National Intelligence Council, of the 700 or so analyses we did, about 400 were responses to questions – called “taskings” in governmentese – from the national security adviser or one of the deputies. 

    National intelligence officers are national experts from inside or outside federal government, and their deputies – the heart and soul of the NIC – are all assigned from intelligence agencies. The largest number come from the CIA, but I worked with a cyber analyst from the Secret Service and a wonderful analyst from the New York Police Department. 

    Resolutely nonpolitical stance

    What was striking then and has struck me both times I’ve had the privilege of running a U.S. intelligence agency is the dedication of the officers. 

    They work for the nation, not for a political party or ideology. As chair of the NIC, I had no idea of the politics of my people, save for the several closest to me. For them, telling truth to power is not a slogan. It is what they do. They are always worried about “politicizing” – producing an assessment to suit a policymaker’s preference or, worse, being pressured to do so. 

    Daily briefers, for instance, give up a year of their lives to come to work at 4 a.m., learn their briefs and then fan out across Washington to brief senior officials. They like being “on the team” of the person they brief, but they become uncomfortable if the conversation turns political. 

    The director of national intelligence sets the tone for that resolutely nonpolitical stance and enforces it through principles articulated in the agency’s analytic standards. As chair of the NIC, for instance, I’d receive regular assessments of both the quality of our analyses and whether we risked becoming “politicized.”

    For their part, do politicians and agency leaders like it when their pet projects are assessed by intelligence as unwise or infeasible? Of course not. I’ve been on that side of the intelligence-policy divide as well. But the United States is much the better for it. 

    This story, originally published on Dec. 4, 2024, has been updated to reflect that Bill Pulte has been chosen by President Trump to be the acting director of national intelligence.

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  • Lawmakers want to see if the Air Force’s venerable A-10 Thunderbolt IIs can be souped up with artificial intelligence, electronic-warfare gear, or better comms to keep it in the fight.

    The House Armed Service Committee’s version of the annual defense policy bill included several Warthog-related provisions as part of an en bloc package. One would require a report on potential A-10 capabilities by Jan. 15, 2027, from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink, and the leaders of Air Combat Command and U.S. Central Command.

    Proposed by Rep. Abraham Hamadeh, R-Ariz., the amendment directs officials to probe “potential incremental modernization options for the A-10 aircraft, including electronic warfare capabilities, decoy or stand-in effects delivery, aerial refueling enhancements, digital communications, sensor integration, precision weapons integration, survivability improvements, open-systems architecture, and human-machine teaming applications” to see if that would “improve the operational return on continued sustainment” for the program.

    The HASC proposals are the latest in a decades-long string of congressional efforts to prevent the Air Force from retiring the A-10, which entered service in 1977 and has proven useful ever since. After the aircraft helped rescue a U.S. airman downed in Iran during this year’s Operation Epic Fury, Air Force leaders promised to keep some squadrons flying until 2030.  

    It is unclear how this promise might affect Hamadeh’s home state, where A-10 operations are slated to wind down at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. 

    Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach told lawmakers last month that the A-10 could be replaced on combat-search-and-rescue missions by F-15 Eagles or F-35 Lightning IIs. The HASC’s NDAA wants the service to investigate how existing or emerging platforms would absorb that high-profile mission and also asks for a study seeing if the aircraft can be upgraded with emerging technology for future fights.

    Hamadeh’s amendment calls for an analysis “of whether currently programmed or planned Air Force capabilities are expected to replicate or improve upon the principal operational effects historically provided by the A-10 aircraft as rescue mission commander, close air support, armed overwatch, forward air controller-airborne, and personnel recovery support missions.”

    The amendment also asks the service to probe if the platform’s mission success from the 1990s to the present could inform “human-machine teaming, autonomous collaborative or adjunct aircraft, artificial intelligence-enabled mission planning and targeting support, digital battlefield communications, distributed air-ground integration, and other emerging capabilities.”

    Another amendment from the Arizona Republican asks the Air Force to consider making A–10 aircraft and equipment available for research on “autonomous or semi-autonomous aircraft integration, mission systems development, digital battlefield communications, or other related capabilities.” An Air Force report detailing those findings would be due roughly six months after the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act.

    Another lawmaker, Rep. John McGuire, R-Va., inserted an amendment that would evaluate the “potential transfer of certain A-10 aircraft” slated for retirement to other military services.

    The A-10 en bloc amendments passed by voice vote, and the House Armed Service Committee’s version passed 44-12 late Thursday evening. The A-10 provisions must receive further approvals from House and Senate lawmakers before making the final version of the NDAA.

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  • WhatsApp says it blocked Israeli firm NSO’s Pegasus spyware activity and is asking a US court to treat the targeting as an injunction breach.

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  • Security researchers have published a detailed, working exploit for a Linux kernel use-after-free that lets an unprivileged local user escalate to root and break out of a container. The flaw, CVE-2026-23111, sits in the kernel’s nf_tables packet-filtering code and was patched upstream on February 5, 2026. Exodus Intelligence released its full technical walkthrough on June 8, and it is not even

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  • Operation FlutterBridge uses fake Google ads and shell companies to deploy FlutterShell, a new macOS backdoor targeting unsuspecting users.

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  • President Donald Trump on Friday signed a national-security memo aimed at speeding up government use of advanced artificial intelligence across the military and intelligence community, while also trying to harden those systems against foreign theft and manipulation.

    The National Security Presidential Memorandum reflects a growing view inside the White House that U.S. security agencies are moving too slowly to adopt frontier AI tools, even as the evolving technology improves rapidly and rivals like China seek ways to craft their own versions.

    It calls for agencies such as the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Office of the National Cyber Director to build “deep, proactive” relationships with AI companies so that cutting-edge models can be made available to national security personnel faster. 

    It also instructs officials to identify areas where AI could improve government operations, including intelligence analysis and cyber threat detection. At the same time, the memo says the tools cannot be used for unlawful surveillance of Americans, language that reflects longstanding civil-liberties concerns about how agencies collect, analyze, and process data.

    The memo also focuses heavily on protecting U.S.-developed AI models from foreign adversaries. It directs senior officials, including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and NSA Director Gen. Joshua Rudd, to work with private-sector companies on security protocols meant to prevent advanced models from being stolen, copied or compromised.

    One area of concern is model distillation, a technique in which an AI system repeatedly queries another AI system in an attempt to mimic its performance and build out a separate model. The White House in April accused China of carrying out “industrial-scale” distillation attacks on U.S. AI systems.

    The memo also directs agencies to work with industry to secure the infrastructure that supports frontier AI, including the data centers that store the enormous amounts of computing power needed to run advanced models. Data centers have recently become more attractive targets during periods of geopolitical tension.

    Trump recently signed an AI security executive order that leans heavily on voluntary cooperation with industry. That order encourages developers to submit powerful new models to a 30-day government review before public release.

    More AI-related guidance is expected soon. Nick Andersen, CISA’s acting director, said last week that the cyber agency is preparing a binding operational directive focused on AI-enabled cyber threats.

    The administration’s approach to AI has shifted in recent months as officials confront a new class of cyber-focused models, including Anthropic’s Mythos, that can rapidly identify vulnerabilities across computer networks. The model has become a major driver of government discussions over how advanced AI systems could reshape both defensive and offensive cyber operations.

    Last week, Anthropic said it is expanding Project Glasswing — its controlled-access program for giving trusted organizations early access to Mythos — to about 150 additional entities. The new group spans more than 15 countries and includes organizations in water, healthcare, communications and other critical infrastructure sectors.

    OpenAI’s recent release of GPT-5.5-Cyber, which also demonstrated sophisticated cyber capabilities, has further heightened concerns in Washington over how quickly these systems are advancing and how they could reshape both cyber defensive and offensive operations.

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