On Oct. 3, 2025, Hamas said that it accepted some aspects of the 20-point proposal, including handing over administration of the Gaza Strip to a body of independent Palestinian technocrats and releasing all remaining Israeli hostages.

Those hostages are the last of the 252 taken during the Oct. 7, 2023, attack – an event that two years on looks to represent a high point, so to speak, of Hamas’ power. As an expert on Palestinian political attitudes, I believe the group now has few options to survive.

Like former resistance groups in past peace processes, it could renounce arms and transform itself into a purely political party. But to do so, it needs to overcome a series of hurdles: confronting other parts of Trump’s plan, its unpopularity at home and its rigid ideology being the three most prominent. 

It is worth taking stock of just how degraded Hamas has become as the result of two years of onslaught by Israel’s vastly superior military.

According to many intelligence reports, Hamas has lost most of its senior command in the Al-Qassam Brigades, its military wing. Izz al-Din al-Haddad, its current commander, survives, having presumably taken over from Mohammed Sinwar – the brother of Yahya Sinwar, mastermind of Oct. 7 attack – who was killed in May 2025. But he presides over a dwindling army.

Trump may not have been exaggerating when he indicated on Truth Social on Oct. 3 that Hamas had lost 25,000 fighters. Estimates regarding the group’s losses vary, but it could represent more than half of the fighting force it had at the beginning of the war.

Hamas has succeeded in recruiting new fighters during that time. But many of these new recruits lack the competence and the experience of the dead ones. And the only motivations the new recruits have are hate and anger toward Israel.

Hamas’ political leadership has also been decimated. Chief political leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, Saleh al-Arouri and Yahya Sinwar, have all been killed.

And it could have been worse. Had the Israeli attack on Hamas’ political leadership in Doha, Qatar, succeeded in September 2025, it could have been a devastating loss for the movement. But the operation missed its primary targets there.

Palestinian public pressure on Hamas has risen as the miseries of war have mounted. 

According to local health officials, more than 67,000 have been killed and more than 169,000 have been injured. Most of the Gaza Strip has been reduced to rubble, and more than 90% of the population has been displaced multiple times– with most residents now living in tents. International organizations have reported famine and starvation in some parts of Gaza.

Hamas has lost its power and influence over many areas now under Israeli control. Israeli military and intelligence have encouraged some members of the local Palestinian clans and militia to offer services in militia-controlled areas.

In such areas, Hamas fighters have often clashed with other Palestinian groups, resulting in many deaths and growing resentment toward Hamas.

Hamas’ execution and torture of Palestinians suspected of collaboration with Israel has only worsened the situation, leading to chaos and lawlessness in many parts of Gaza.

It is little wonder, then, that half of Palestinians in Gazan in the latest poll of attitudes – taken in May 2025 – say they supported anti-Hamas demonstrations. Indeed, support for the group in both Gaza and the West Bank has continued to decline as the war has progressed.

The ongoing war and the inhumane daily conditions that local Palestinians in Gaza are dealing with have led to exhaustion and fatigue among the public.

On social media, many Palestinians are asking Hamas publicly to endorse the Trump plan and put an end to their misery. 

In deciding whether to accept all the plan’s 20 points, Hamas will, from its perspective, have to weigh whether agreeing to a very bad outcome is better than the alternative. Trump has warned that a failure to get on board will cause Hamas to face “all hell.”

Hamas has already agreed to release the remaining Israeli hostages and to relinquish power in Gaza to a technocratic Palestinian committee. If endorsed in full, this would put an end to the war and see the gradual Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and no expulsion of the Palestinians out of Gaza.

Egypt, Qatar and Turkey have been facilitating Hamas’ response to the plan. And there is huge regional and international pressure to get the deal over the line.

However, it would force Hamas to disarm itself and allow the entry of an international and regional force into Gaza to oversee the destruction of military infrastructure, including tunnels, weapons manufacturing and the remaining rockets – points of the latest plan that Hamas appears more unwilling to accept.

What happens to the remaining Hamas fighters is a sticking point that might lead to the collapse of the whole plan. 

And any rejection of the plan that can be blamed on Hamas will no doubt be welcomed by members of the Israeli extreme right. Hard-line factions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition have an alternative plan: to fully occupy Gaza, expel the Palestinians and reestablish Israeli settlements in Gaza.

Perhaps the most viable option for Hamas is to transform itself into a political party. But to do so, the group will need to reform not only its structures but also its ideology.

Political momentum is swinging back to a two-state solution. France and Saudi Arabia recently spearheaded a fresh push to that end at the United Nations, and a host of Western nations recognized Palestinian statehood for the first time. Hamas may feel the pressure to finally accept a two-state solution, something it has long resisted. For its part, Trump’s plan only makes vague assertions noting the Palestinian “aspiration” for a state.

If transforming into a purely political party is to be the fate of Hamas, it will need to play its cards shrewdly and swiftly. The Palestine Liberation Organization went through this process after its departure from Beirut in 1982, eventually putting politics and diplomacy over armed resistance. And Qatar, Turkey and Egypt can help Hamas moderate its stances, too. 

The rigid ideology of Hamas remains a hurdle. Since it was formed in 1987, Hamas has tethered itself to a hard-line Islamist ideology that does not allow fundamental compromises on issues such as recognition of Israel and the development of Palestine as a secular state.

But there is the recent example of Syria where, following the ouster of long-term dictator Bashar Assad, the main Islamist fighting group pivoted to politics – and was lauded in the international community for doing so.

Whether Hamas can succeed in such a transformation – should it even attempt to – remains to be seen. And there is one final snag: Even if Hamas does accept the latest peace proposal, other Palestinian militant groups in Gaza might not – and could attempt to sabotage the whole process.

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Certainly, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is preparing for all eventualities. On Sept. 29, 2025, the leftist leader signed a decree granting him additional powers. The following day, Maduro threatened a “state of emergency.” Already, Caracas has carried out military drills amid talk of being a “republic in arms.”

It follows a month in which Washington has positioned warships, an attack submarine and aircraft in the Caribbean and destroyed at least four suspected “go-fast” drug boats. At the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 23, U.S. President Donald Trump warned of more to come, vowing to blow drug traffickers “out of existence” while repeating his assertion that Maduro was behind the trafficking networks.

Maduro and his generals deny that charge. Nonetheless, Washington has set a $50-million bounty on Maduro’s arrest and has rejected Venezuela’s appeals for talks.

As an expert on international security and U.S.-Latin American relations, I believe the U.S. position appears to be inching toward regime change from a prior position of ambiguity that has fallen short of an outright pledge to remove Maduro. 

But Washington will be aware that any direct military engagement in Venezuela will be a messy affair. Despite increasing international isolation, Maduro still has friends in Moscow and Beijing, as well as closer to home in Havana. And such factors may force the Trump administration to continue to walk a fine line between maximum pressure on the Maduro government without full commitment to armed conflict.

Recent deployments by the U.S. Southern Command demonstrate a shift in posture by the U.S. administration. 

The USS Stockdale became the ninth U.S. Navy vessel and third destroyer – alongside USS Gravely and USS Jason Dunham – to join the USS Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group maneuvering between Puerto Rico and the Lesser and Leeward Antilles, and the waters north of Venezuela. In all, at least 4,500 Marines and sailors are positioned in the area. 

Meanwhile, at least 10 F-35 fighters and multiple MQ-9 drones are reportedly operating from Aguadilla and Ceiba airports in Puerto Rico, offering the capacity for persistent surveillance and strike options. 

These forces are more powerful than the entire Venezuelan navy but reportedly fall short of the forces needed for a full-scale invasion.

For the moment, SouthCom is framing the campaign as enhanced counternarcotics operations, rather than a prelude to a blockade or invasion. Statements have highlighted joint patrols and interdiction efforts with the Royal Netherlands Navy, Canada, the Dominican Republic and the United Kingdom, and the humanitarian or information-sharing nature of missions. 

SouthCom has described its position as one of readiness, not war. But this could change, especially with the much-anticipated 2025 national defense reviewexpected to prioritize countering the perceived threat of Chinese interference in the Western Hemisphere.

And it is worth recalling that the U.S. has long maintained a light but steady military footprint in the region.

Caracas has staged military displays of its own.

Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López announced on Sept. 15 three days of drills involving naval units, aircraft air-defense assets and militia participation. Maduro has declared “maximum preparedness” and threatened to mobilize a “republic in arms” if attacked. 

If enacted, the state of emergency would be effective for 90 days and centralize military control in the office of the president. The aim is clear: to project resolve and raise the cost for Washington of any further escalation.

Venezuela’s military is not negligible, but readiness has been eroded by decades of economic crisis, sanctions and maintenance shortfalls. It is no match for U.S. military dominance at sea or in the air, although it could inflict damage through asymmetric tactics and militia mobilization. 

On the U.S. side, the means for coercion through targeted strikes, interdictions, cyberattacks and sanctions are already at hand. Further escalation may, however, hinge on a catalyzing event, such as an attack resulting in the killing of Venezuelan or U.S. military personnel. 

Regionally, most governments have avoided taking sides. One exception is Colombian President Gustavo Petro, who at the United Nations General Assembly called for “criminal proceedings” over the recent U.S. strikes. 

In the Caribbean, there is little appetite for hosting a U.S. invasion force. The president of Dominica noted in her speech at the General Assembly that “there is no place in the Caribbean for war.” One exception is Guyana, which is locked in a territorial dispute with Venezuala over the oil-rich Essequibo region and has welcomed U.S. security cooperation. 

Yet, an attack on Venezuela or an attempt at regime change risks rallying the country’s allies. 

First among them in the region is Cuba. Cuban intelligence and security advisers have long been embedded across Venezuela’s military and security services. This gives Maduro some resilience against internal coups and complicates U.S. efforts to precipitate elite defections from Maduro’s inner circle. 

While expressing political support for Maduro, it is highly unlikely that Cuba would ever be in a position to supplement any Venezuelan combat forces given Havana’s own weak position, struggling economy and relatively modest military capabilities. 

And despite fresh affirmations of solidarity and the continued presence of Russian “military experts,” Moscow also lacks the political military bandwidth for large, new deployments. Still, long-standing military and technical ties such as training, maintenance, weapons sales and selective systems support offer Maduro a modest but valuable hedge against external pressure. 

Even a token port call or bomber overflight could add political friction – and pause for thought in Washington. Russia has sent nuclear-capable bombers to Venezuela in the past, and its navy made a publicized visit to La Guaira in July 2024. 

One much more consequential factor could be the position of China. 

Beijing plays a consequential role as a buyer of Venezuelan oil. As Western sanctions have set in, a growing share of Venezuelan hydrocarbon exports is now funneled through “shadow fleet” tankers and complex rerouting schemes, allowing crude to reach Chinese refineries despite sanctions and export restrictions. 

Any U.S. campaign that disrupts these flows would hit Chinese refiners first. This would likely prompt Beijing to push back diplomatically and commercially. 

In late September, China stressed that it “opposes the use of force” and decried external interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs – a clear rebuke of the U.S. military buildup. 

The Chinese ambassador in Caracas has also conveyed solidarity to his host, emphasizing that Beijing will “firmly support Venezuela in safeguarding sovereignty, national dignity and social stability.” 

China is offering diplomatic support but has stopped short of any pledge of force. 

For now, America’s most likely path is, I believe, coastal policing and military pressure. At sea, this means the U.S. continuing to lead counternarcotics operations, but with Navy cover close at hand. The U.S. buildup could well boost underground opposition networks in Venezuela, increasing pressure on the Maduro regime from within.

This will be paired with increased financial pressure in the form of sanctionsaimed at further squeezing Venezuela’s state oil industry, but calibrated to avoid a global energy shock. Measures also include restricting dollar-clearing and maritime insurance, blacklisting intermediaries and dark fleet tankers, and targeting front companies.

Nonetheless, expectations of a military clash are edging upward. Several forecasters now put the odds of some form of U.S. strike against Venezuela before year’s end at roughly 1 in 3, with the chances rising further into 2026. 

Yet the prospect of an outright invasion remains, I believe, remote. U.S. domestic politics may act as a brake: Opinion polls show most Americans oppose military action to topple Maduro, and an even larger majority reject the idea of a full-scale invasion.

Even so, three factors could shape if and when Washington steps up its action: a deadly incident at sea involving civilians or U.S. personnel; hard evidence that Venezuelan officials are directly tied to large-scale trafficking to the U.S.; and regional governments lining up behind stronger action.

While the odds of a strike and even regime change are rising, Washington’s strategy in the very near term appears to remain one of pressure without full commitment, using shows of force, sanctions and selective strikes to weaken Caracas while avoiding being dragged into a messy war or sparking an oil shock.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.