• Enterprises everywhere are embracing MCP servers—tools that grant AI assistants “god-mode” permissions to send emails, run database queries, and automate tedious tasks. But no one ever stopped to ask: Who built these tools? Today, the first real-world malicious MCP server—postmark-mcp—has emerged, quietly exfiltrating every email it processes. Since its initial release, postmark-mcp has been downloaded […]

    The post Malicious MCP Server Discovered Stealing Sensitive Emails Using AI Agents appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • The Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) group known as COLDRIVER has been attributed to a fresh round of ClickFix-style attacks designed to deliver two new “lightweight” malware families tracked as BAITSWITCH and SIMPLEFIX. Zscaler ThreatLabz, which detected the new multi-stage ClickFix campaign earlier this month, described BAITSWITCH as a downloader that ultimately drops SIMPLEFIX, a

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  • Apache Airflow maintainers have disclosed a serious security issue, tracked as CVE-2025-54831, that allows users holding only read permissions to view sensitive connection details via both the Airflow API and web interface. The vulnerability, present in Airflow version 3.0.3, undermines the platform’s intended “write-only” treatment of secrets in Connections and could lead to unauthorized exposure […]

    The post Apache Airflow Vulnerability Lets Read-Only Users Access Sensitive Data appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • The first-ever malicious Model-Context-Prompt (MCP) server discovered in the wild, a trojanized npm package named postmark-mcp that has been secretly exfiltrating sensitive data from users’ emails.

    The package, downloaded approximately 1,500 times per week, contained a backdoor that copied every email processed by the tool to a server controlled by the attacker. This incident highlights a significant and emerging threat in the AI-powered software supply chain.

    npm package Downloads
    npm package Downloads

    According to security firm Koi analysis postmark-mcp package was designed as an MCP server to integrate with the Postmark email service, allowing AI assistants to automate email-sending tasks.

    For its first 15 versions, the tool functioned as expected, building a foundation of trust within the developer community and becoming integrated into hundreds of workflows.

    However, starting with version 1.0.16, a single line of malicious code was added. This code silently added a Bcc field to every outgoing email, sending a copy to phan@giftshop.club.

    The compromised data included everything from password resets and invoices to confidential internal communications.

    The developer behind the package appeared to be a legitimate software engineer from Paris with an established GitHub profile, a tactic that likely helped the malicious package evade suspicion.

    The attack was a classic case of impersonation; the developer copied the code from a legitimate GitHub repository officially maintained by Postmark (ActiveCampaign), injected the backdoor, and published it to the npm registry under the same name.

    Malicious MCP Server Stealing Data
    Malicious MCP Server Stealing Data

    Koi reported that its risk engine flagged the package after detecting suspicious behavior changes in version 1.0.16. The simplicity of the attack is what makes it particularly alarming.

    The developer did not exploit a zero-day vulnerability or use a complex hacking technique; they abused the trust inherent in the open-source ecosystem.

    First Malicious MCP Server Found

    This incident exposes a critical vulnerability in the architecture of AI agent tools. MCP servers are granted high-level permissions to operate autonomously, often with full access to emails, databases, and APIs.

    Unlike traditional software, these tools are used by AI assistants that execute tasks without human review. The AI has no way of detecting that an email is being secretly copied, as it only verifies that the primary task of sending the email was completed successfully.

    This creates a major security blind spot for organizations. MCP servers often operate outside of established security perimeters, bypassing Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems, vendor risk assessments, and email gateways.

    The estimated impact is significant, with calculations suggesting that between 3,000 and 15,000 emails could have been exfiltrated daily from around 300 organizations.

    Malicious MCP Server Analysis
    Malicious MCP Server Analysis

    After being contacted, the developer deleted the package from npm. However, this action does not remove the compromised package from systems where it is already installed. Any user with version 1.0.16 or later of postmark-mcp remains vulnerable.

    Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and Mitigation

    • Package: postmark-mcp (npm)
    • Malicious Version: 1.0.16 and later
    • Backdoor Email: phan@giftshop[.]club
    • Domain: giftshop[.]club

    Users of postmark-mcp are urged to immediately uninstall the package and rotate any credentials or sensitive information that may have been transmitted via email.

    This attack serves as a stark warning about the risks associated with the rapidly growing MCP ecosystem, emphasizing the need for robust verification and continuous monitoring of all third-party tools used by AI agents.

    Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X for daily cybersecurity updates. Contact us to feature your stories.

    The post First-Ever Malicious MCP Server Found in the Wild Steals Emails via AI Agents appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • The U.S. Department of Defense should have one key priority: getting weapons to warfighters fast and staying ahead of adversaries, especially China. Call the Pentagon whatever you like; our troops will call it late if the gear shows up after the conflict. What matters is collapsing the time it takes to field new capabilities, not rebranding the letterhead.

    President Trump has already shown a willingness to confront the Pentagon’s bureaucracy. His team deserves credit for pushing real acquisition reforms, including eliminating the outdated JCIDS process and beginning to strip out acquisition  bottlenecks that add months or years to timelines. These moves are not just housekeeping—they are essential to delivering capability at the speed of modern warfare.

    He also demonstrated vision by creating the U.S. Space Force, the first new military service in more than 75 years. With the growing threat from anti-satellite weapons and the increasing militarization of space, this was the right move to ensure America can fight and win in a contested domain. It showed foresight about the future of warfare.

    But the harder question now is whether Trump can drive defense reforms to completion—and make them stick. Administrations of both parties have admitted for decades that the system is broken. Trump could be the first to translate recognition into sustained results.

    The fastest forcing function in government is presidential attention. When a president cares about an issue and invests political capital in it, bureaucracies move. When that attention drifts, so does momentum. If Trump wants defense reform to be a lasting part of his legacy, he must put his personal authority behind it—not once, but continuously.

    That means more than one-off speeches or occasional reviews. It means setting up processes that keep the pressure on, month after month, and holding people accountable for progress. Without this sustained involvement, even the best reforms risk being buried by inertia.

    Here are some near-term steps that Trump can take:

    • Hold monthly “Speed-to-Field” sessions at the White House with the President. Each session should ask: What has been delivered to the warfighter? What is stuck? Who is responsible for clearing the roadblocks? Program managers, service chiefs, and industry leaders should be held publicly accountable.

    • Appoint a White House Coordinator for Defense Reform. A trusted “defense czar” with deep knowledge of defense technology and acquisition can ensure presidential directives are carried out, not stalled by layers of bureaucracy.

    • Set strict timelines. Require high-priority programs to deliver a minimum viable capability within 12 months. Perfection can come later; the point is to get something useful into the field quickly and improve it over time.

    • Streamline and simplify. Collapse duplicative reviews, consolidate low-value reports, and eliminate paperwork that cannot be certified as mission-critical by a Senate-confirmed official. Less paperwork means more progress.

    • Reward outcomes, not process. Promotion and recognition should go to leaders who deliver systems quickly, not those who avoid all risk or perfect briefing slides. The measure that matters is capability in the hands of warfighters.

    This is about more than checklists. It’s about culture. For the past 30 years, the Department of Defense has grown increasingly risk-averse. Leaders fear that even small failures will bring congressional investigations, IG audits, or career setbacks. As a result, officials spend more time avoiding blame than pursuing bold solutions.

    But the Pentagon is not solely to blame. Congress plays a central role in this dysfunction. Over time, lawmakers have layered statute upon statute, report upon report, and requirement upon requirement—often for good reasons, like oversight and accountability. Yet the cumulative effect has been paralysis. Endless reporting consumes thousands of staff hours that could be spent delivering capability. Budget rules that rigidly divide money into narrow “colors” of money—research, procurement, operations—force needless delays and reprogramming. Turf battles between committees make it even harder to streamline.

    Trump should direct the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to compile a list of the most burdensome laws, reports, and regulations that should be eliminated. Then he should use his political leverage to push Congress to act. This is not about weakening oversight. It is about clearing away the underbrush of bureaucracy that suffocates speed.

    History shows that the United States can move with speed when it chooses. The Polaris ballistic missile system was designed, developed, and deployed in just five years in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By contrast, many of today’s programs take more than a decade. What changed?

    Marc Dunkelman, in his book Why Nothing Works: Who Killed Progress and How to Bring It Back, makes the case that excessive layers of regulation, oversight, and risk aversion have strangled America’s ability to deliver. John Hyten, a former Joint Chiefs vice chairman, has also spokenpowerfully about how these burdens cripple the Pentagon’s ability to field capabilities quickly. Both are right. The culture of delay is not inevitable—it is a choice. And choices can be changed.

    Acquisition reform is necessary, but it is not sufficient. America’s military-technical edge rests on two other pillars: immigration and the federal–university research partnership.

    As I have argued in Defense One and Defense News, America’s ability to attract global talent is one of its greatest advantages over China. Cutting legal immigration or restricting the ability of top scientists and engineers to work in the United States would be self-defeating. Similarly, our unparalleled university system has incubated countless breakthroughs in defense-related technology, from stealth to semiconductors.

    If we allow funding for federal research to decline, or if we sever ties between universities and government research programs, we will be handing China a long-term advantage. Trump should not just reform acquisition; he should double down on these partnerships that keep America at the cutting edge.

    During my time in government, I saw the cost of bureaucracy up close. Teams were often overwhelmed producing reports no one read while urgent missions waited. The lesson is clear: when leaders put speed at the center—and back it with authority—capability moves. When they don’t, it doesn’t.

    Trump has a chance to make defense reform a defining legacy. But success will require sustained focus, not symbolic gestures. It will require cutting through paperwork, empowering risk-takers, and holding leaders accountable for results.

    If America wants to stay ahead of adversaries like China, we must out-build, out-code, and out-ship them. That means setting the right measure—time to first unit equipped—and relentlessly driving it down. Publish cycle-time dashboards. Celebrate the programs that beat the clock. Cancel the ones that don’t.

    Trump can make defense reform work. But only if he keeps his focus on the right issue: speeding the delivery of weapons to the warfighter, fixing the congressional–Pentagon bottlenecks that slow the system, and sustaining the innovation ecosystem that underpins U.S. strength.

    Renaming a department won’t achieve that. Leadership, persistence, and the courage to break bureaucratic habits will. That is the real test of whether Trump can translate political power into military capability—and whether America will stay ahead of its adversaries in the decades to come.

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  • Malware operators aligned with North Korea have forged a sophisticated partnership with covert IT workers to target corporate organizations worldwide. This collaboration, detailed in a new white paper presented at Virus Bulletin 2025, sheds light on the intertwined operations of the DeceptiveDevelopment cybercrime syndicate and the WageMole activity cluster, revealing a hybrid threat that marries […]

    The post Malware Gangs Enlist Covert North Korean IT Workers in Corporate Attacks appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • Car makers don’t trust blueprints. They smash prototypes into walls. Again and again. In controlled conditions. Because design specs don’t prove survival. Crash tests do. They separate theory from reality. Cybersecurity is no different. Dashboards overflow with “critical” exposure alerts. Compliance reports tick every box.  But none of that proves what matters most to a CISO: The

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  • CloudSEK has uncovered a sophisticated Loader-as-a-Service botnet campaign spanning the last six months, leveraging exposed command-and-control logs to orchestrate attacks against SOHO routers, embedded Linux devices, and enterprise applications. The threat actors exploit unsanitized POST parameters—such as NTP, syslog, and hostname fields—alongside default credentials and known CVEs in WebLogic, WordPress, and vBulletin systems to achieve […]

    The post New Botnet ‘Loader-as-a-Service’ Turns Home Routers and IoT into Mirai Farms appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • CISA has issued an Emergency Directive mandating immediate action to mitigate two critical zero-day vulnerabilities, CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362, actively exploited against Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) and select Firepower platforms. 

    The vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated remote code execution and privilege escalation, enabling advanced threat actors to modify read-only memory (ROM) for persistence through reboot and system upgrades.

     Exploit Cisco ASA Hardware Zero-Days

    CISA links this campaign to the ArcaneDoor activity first identified in early 2024, during which adversaries demonstrated the capability to manipulate ASA ROM as early as 2024. 

    By exploiting zero-days in ASA hardware, ASA-Service Module (ASA-SM), ASA Virtual (ASAv), and ASA firmware on Firepower 2100/4100/9300 devices, attackers achieve unauthenticated remote code execution

    Although Secure Boot on Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) appliances detects ROM manipulation, ASAs lack this protection, making them prime targets.

    Cisco has released security updates addressing both vulnerabilities:

    • CVE-2025-20333 allows remote code execution on vulnerable ASAs.
    • CVE-2025-20362 permits privilege escalation to root-level access.

    Failure to remediate poses an unacceptable risk to federal information systems and critical infrastructure.

    CVE IdentifierTitleCVSS 3.1 ScoreSeverity
    CVE-2025-20333Cisco ASA Remote Code Execution Zero-Day9.8Critical
    CVE-2025-20362Cisco ASA Privilege Escalation Zero-Day7.2High

    Emergency Directive

    For all public-facing ASA hardware, perform CISA’s Core Dump and Hunt Instructions Parts 1–3 and submit core dumps via the Malware Next Gen portal by September 26, 2025, 11:59 PM EDT.

    If “Compromise Detected,” disconnect (but do not power off), report to CISA, and coordinate incident response. If “No Compromise Detected,” proceed to software updates or device decommissioning.

    Permanently disconnect ASA hardware with end-of-support on or before September 30, 2025. Agencies unable to comply must apply Cisco-provided software updates by September 26 and plan for decommissioning.

    Download and apply the latest Cisco updates for ASA hardware models supported through August 31, 2026, and for all ASAv and FTD appliances by September 26, 2025.

    By October 2, 2025, 11:59 PM EDT, submit a complete inventory and action report to CISA using the provided template. These measures apply to all federal information systems, including those hosted by third-party providers (FedRAMP-authorized or otherwise). 

    Agencies remain responsible for maintaining inventories and ensuring compliance. CISA will report cross-agency status and outstanding issues to senior leadership by February 1, 2026.

    Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X for daily cybersecurity updates. Contact us to feature your stories.

    The post CISA Warns of Cisco Firewall 0-Day Vulnerabilities Actively Exploited in the Wild appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • In late 2024, a new wave of cyber espionage emerged targeting global telecommunications infrastructure. Operating under the moniker Salt Typhoon, this Chinese state-sponsored group has focused its efforts on routers, firewalls, VPN gateways, and lawful intercept systems within major telecom providers.

    By embedding bespoke firmware implants and leveraging living-off-the-land binaries, Salt Typhoon has achieved persistent access capable of siphoning sensitive communications metadata, VoIP configurations, and subscriber profiles.

    The group’s objectives align with strategic Chinese intelligence priorities: signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, counterintelligence support, and preparation of potential cyber disruption operations.

    Salt Typhoon campaigns exploit both public-facing vulnerabilities in network edge devices and misconfigurations in management interfaces. Initial access is typically gained through exploitation of router web interfaces, such as CVE-2023-20198 on Cisco IOS XE and CVE-2023-35082 in Ivanti Connect Secure appliances.

    After breaching these devices, the adversary deploys a custom firmware rootkit—internally dubbed Demodex—which survives reboots and evades standard detection mechanisms.

    Domaintools analysts identified distinctive domain registration patterns supporting Salt Typhoon’s infrastructure, noting the use of fabricated U.S. personas and ProtonMail accounts for WHOIS entries, an unusual lapse in operational security for a state-sponsored actor.

    Chinese Corporate Hacking Support Infrastructure (Source – Domaintools)

    Once implanted, the malware establishes encrypted command-and-control channels over DNS beacons or HTTPS on TCP port 443.

    Regular beacon intervals are disguised as routine firmware update checks, blending into normal network traffic. Exfiltrated data includes lawful intercept logs, call detail records (CDRs), and configuration dumps from edge routers.

    Telecommunications providers in the United States, United Kingdom, and several European nations have reported unusual outbound traffic consistent with these implants, enabling the MSS (Ministry of State Security) to harvest high-value intelligence on user communications patterns and network topologies.

    Operation impact

    The impact of these operations extends beyond raw data theft. Long-dwell persistence in critical devices grants the attackers the ability to sabotage or reroute communications during geopolitical crises.

    By maintaining backdoor access to core routers, Salt Typhoon can disrupt SIP traffic or inject false routing entries, potentially degrading service or enabling additional espionage within allied defense and government networks.

    This blend of espionage and contingency planning underscores the dual-use nature of the campaign: everyday intelligence collection complemented by latent offensive capabilities.

    A deeper look at Infection Mechanism reveals the precision of Salt Typhoon’s exploitation and implant deployment.

    The group’s engineers have crafted a minimalistic loader that leverages the router’s own command shell to write malicious binaries into /usr/bin/ and modify startup scripts.

    For instance, a typical persistence snippet injected into a Juniper device’s configuration might appear as:-

    # Inject persistence into startup script
    echo "/usr/bin/demodex_loader &" >> /etc/rc.d/rc.local
    chmod +x /usr/bin/demodex_loader
    /usr/bin/demodex_loader --install --target=/dev/mtd0

    This code writes the loader invocation into the router’s boot sequence and flashes the rootkit into flash memory. The loader verifies the firmware version and selects the appropriate memory offsets to avoid bricking the device.

    Once executed, Demodex hooks low-level system calls to intercept configuration reads and hide its presence, ensuring subsequent firmware updates cannot remove it without manual intervention.

    By combining targeted exploitation of known CVEs, stealthy firmware implants, and contractor-enabled domain infrastructure, Salt Typhoon represents a sophisticated example of China’s evolving cyber espionage capabilities against telecommunications networks.

    The campaign’s operational model—outsourced infrastructure provisioning paired with state-directed tasking—poses significant challenges for attribution and defense, but also offers defenders opportunities to disrupt emerging domains and certificate pivots before active exploitation begins.

    Follow us on Google NewsLinkedIn, and X to Get More Instant UpdatesSet CSN as a Preferred Source in Google.

    The post Chinese State-Sponsored Hackers Attacking Telecommunications Infrastructure to Harvest Sensitive Data appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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