For China’s People’s Liberation Army, massive parades like the recent celebration of the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II are more than propaganda set pieces. Military leaders use them to show their Party superiors that the force is progressing towards its modernization goals, including being ready to fight jointly and to defeat any potential adversary—particularly “the strong adversary,” i.e., the United States. And as PLA texts attest, parades are opportunities to unveil new systems intended to deepen nuclear and conventional deterrence.

The hours-long showcase on Sept. 3 offered glimpses of new weapons—especially missiles—and hints about about China’s progress on key military technologies. These are valuable because the PLA operates in an opaque manner, and because its equipment and weapons, with some notable exceptions, have seldom been tested on the battlefield. But analysts must proceed cautiously: the parade was at heart a carefully calibrated influence operation. As one U.S. military analyst recently noted, the military equipment that the PLA displayed “was exactly what they wanted the world and the U.S. military to see.”   

So what should we make of five PLA missile systems that made their public debut on Sept. 3? Are they mere showpieces—“old wine in a new bottle,” as the Chinese idiom goes—or are they showstoppers that should give U.S. military planners pause? 

DF-61 ICBM: Showpiece (mostly). Little is known about this massive, road-mobile, solid-fueled ballistic missile beyond its reported range of over 12,000 kilometers and alleged payload of up to ten multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. But several analysts suspect it may be an incrementally updated version of the DF-41 road-mobile ICBM that appeared in the 2019 parade and is now operated by the PLA Rocket Force. The missiles are similar in design and use the same transporter-erector-launcher. Both systems are made by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology under the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, an enormous state-owned aerospace enterprise that is the country’s sole ICBM manufacturer. 

In the parade, the DF-61 rolled among other strategic weapons, which further suggests that it is simply a better version of the nuclear DF-41. And yet: the possibility exists that its placement was deception. It is conceivable that the weapon is a new conventional ICBM—and a significant boost to the PLA’s long-range tactical striking power.

DF-5C ICBM: Showpiece. Bringing up the rear of the parade’s missile column was the DF-5C, an upgraded variant of the four-decade-old DF-5, the PLA’s oldest active ICBM. The arrival of the C variant adds range and warheads to China’s array of liquid-fueled, silo-based missiles. But its technology is not new, having been first tested in 2017; and its predecessor DF-5B could also carry MIRVs to any target in the United States. 

In the parade, the DF-5B followed the DF-31BJ, an improved version of the DF-31AG solid-fueled ICBM that first appeared in 2017. The prominence of these two silo-based missiles at the end of the line is a reminder that even as the PLA adds road-mobile ICBMs and works to consolidate a nuclear triad with better sea- and air-launched nuclear missiles, its expanding network of ICBM silos remains another key element of deterrence. 

CJ-1000 long-range hypersonic cruise missile: Showstopper. The parade’s “cruise missile column” saw the debut of several advanced air, sea, and ground-launched cruise missiles. None is a bigger gamechanger than the Changjian-1000, which ups the PLARF’s precision-strike capabilities with engines that U.S. missiles still lack. 

Unlike the PLARF’s current DF-17 hypersonic missile, which uses a boost glide system, the CJ-1000 and the YJ-19 missile (see below) are propelled by airbreathing scramjet engines, which makes the PLA just the second military, after Russia’s, to deploy scramjet hypersonic weapons. The U.S. Air Force’s effort to develop a hypersonic cruise missile, meanwhile, is delayed and over budget.

The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command reports that the CJ-1000 can launch quickly and penetrate deeply against high-value land or sea targets. And although U.S. missile defense systems such as THAAD have received upgrades to better track and intercept hypersonic attacks, they will be challenged by the high maneuverability and long range of the CJ-1000, which can purportedly launch from Fujian in eastern China and hit Guam in 38 minutes. Xinhua agrees: the speedy, nimble, long-ranged CJ-1000 is a potential gamechanger that threatens U.S. bases in the western Pacific.

YJ-19 hypersonic anti-ship missile: Showstopper. The parade’s anti-ship missile formation introduced four new types—three of which are likely hypersonic. Perhaps the most notable is the YJ-19, whose scramjet is reportedly capable of flying faster than Mach 10 out to around 1,440 kilometers. Its waverider configuration harnesses its own shockwaves to improve lift-drag ratio.

If the capabilities are as advertised, the YJ-19 will greatly improve the ability of the PLA Navy’s surface ships and attack submarines to strike enemy warships within the first and even second island chains. Like the CJ-1000, it provides a capability that the U.S. does not currently have and raises the level of risk to U.S. forces responding to a contingency in our around Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea.

HQ-29 anti-ballistic missile and anti-satellite weapon: Showstopper. Among the several HQ-series surface-to-air missiles debuted in the parade’s air defense column, the standout was the Hongqi-29—and not just because it was the largest. 

The HQ-29 is a follow-on to the HQ-19 high-altitude interceptor, which employs kinetic-kill technology akin to the U.S. THAAD system. It is road-mobile, unlike other long-range interceptors that are silo-based, allowing for more flexible deployments and optimization of launch position. The HQ-29 also provides the PLA with an interceptor that can hit incoming ICBMs in midcourse—or even low-earth orbit satellites. If and when it is fielded, it will improve China’s regional ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite warfare capabilities.  

China clearly intended its Sept. 3 parade to convey its growing military strength and technological ambition, and it succeeded. The new and not-so-new missiles clearly show the PLA’s growing ability to project power and Beijing’s intention to fundamentally alter the region’s military balance. 

]]>