This success was not built overnight. It is the result of more than two decades of sustained operational, technical, and political investment in integrated air and missile defense architecture across the Middle East. It reflects the work of multiple administrations, close coordination with Israel, and deepening security partnerships with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It also reflects the leadership of commanders such as Gen. CQ Brown Jr. and Gen. David Goldfein—leaders with whom I worked closely to advance interoperability and integration during their tenures at U.S. Air Forces Central Command.

Strategic patience paid off. But success on the battlefield has exposed a strategic vulnerability Washington can no longer ignore: America’s interceptor inventory problem.

In 2016, speaking in Abu Dhabi as assistant U.S. secretary of State, I argued that missile defense cooperation in the Middle East was not simply about deploying hardware. It was about building a regional security architecture: linking sensors, sharing early-warning data, improving command and control, and—critically—building political trust among partners with long histories of limited military integration.

That vision has matured. Today, U.S., Israeli, Emirati, Qatari, and Saudi air and missile defense systems operate in increasingly coordinated and interoperable ways. Patriot systems counter lower-altitude threats, THAAD provides upper-tier coverage, and SM-3 interceptors engage ballistic missiles in space. Together, these layered defenses complicate adversary targeting and improve survivability.

Recent days demonstrate that this approach works. The scale and sophistication of Iran’s retaliation were substantial. The defenses held.

The lesson is clear: integrated architectures outperform isolated systems.

This is the same principle I emphasized in a recent article on what it will take to make initiatives such as “Golden Dome” credible and sustainable. Missile defense is not a standalone shield. It is a system-of-systems—one that depends as much on interoperability, industrial capacity, and political alignment as it does on individual interceptors.

Inventory crisis 

Yet operational success has come at a cost.

Intercepting large salvos burns through munitions at an alarming rate. And the United States is now drawing from the same limited stockpiles to support:

•Ongoing commitments in the Middle East.

•Deterrence and defense requirements in Korea and Guam.

•NATO reassurance efforts.

•And potential contingencies involving China.

As the Wall Street Journal recently reported, maintaining adequate stocks of THAAD, Patriot, and SM-3 interceptors is becoming a mounting concern for the Pentagon.

This should not surprise anyone.

When I served as a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee in 2007, responsible for the missile defense account, interceptor inventories were already falling short of operational needs. Congress acknowledged then that missile threats existed and that near-term defenses were required. A then-recent Joint Capabilities Mix study concluded the United States needed roughly twice as many SM-3 and THAAD interceptors just to meet the minimum requirements identified by regional combatant commanders. Those concerns were acknowledged—but ultimately set aside. Nearly two decades later, after repeated warnings and multiple crises, the gap Congress identified has not been closed—it has grown.

Production lines were sized for peacetime assumptions. Budget tradeoffs prioritized other weapons.

For years, the United States optimized for efficiency.  We are now living in an era that demands resilience.

The China factor

The Middle East fight is not the most stressing scenario the United States could face.

A major contingency in the Indo-Pacific — particularly one involving large ballistic and cruise missile salvos — would place unprecedented demands on interceptor inventories. China has invested heavily in missile forces designed to saturate and overwhelm defenses. Any serious planning scenario must assume extended engagements and high expenditure rates.

If the United States struggles to sustain inventories in a limited regional conflict, what would happen in a multi-theater crisis?

This is not an argument for panic. It is an argument for realism. Architecture alone is insufficient. Integration, innovation, and industrial capacity must move together. That logic applies here. The United States should:

1.   Expand production of missile defense interceptors for systems like THAAD, Patriot, and SM-3.

2.   Establish multi-year procurement authorities to stabilize demand signals for industry.

3.   Work with allies and partners on co-production and co-financing arrangements.

4.   Accelerate the integration of lower-cost intercept solutions and complementary capabilities such as directed energy where feasible.

5.   Treat interceptor inventory as a strategic asset, not a budgetary afterthought.

Missile defense is no longer a niche capability. It is a core pillar of deterrence in multiple theaters.

None of this should diminish the extraordinary progress made over the past 15 years in missile defense cooperation with Israel and our GCC partners. Countless lives were saved in recent days because of that investment.

The political groundwork, the interoperability exercises, the data-sharing agreements, and the hard conversations about burden-sharing — they all mattered.

We are seeing the dividends now.

But strategy is not static. As I argued in an analysis of regional missile defense in the Middle East, the threat continues to adapt. Drones, cruise missiles, and maneuvering ballistic missiles are reshaping the offense-defense balance. Architecture must evolve. So must stockpiles.

Strategic patience built the system. Now Congress and the Pentagon must ensure we have the inventories to sustain it. Because the next crisis may not give us the luxury of time.

Frank A. Rose is president of Chevalier Strategic Advisors, a strategic advisory firm focused on the intersection of geopolitics and defense technology. `He previously served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy, a Professional Staff Member on the House Armed Services Committee, and as a Policy Advisor at the U.S. Defense Department.