For years, I've watched the Pentagon's innovation process with the same mixture of frustration and respect that a coach feels for a team with immense potential but a flawed game plan. So when I heard the news that the Defense Secretary is considering dismantling the JCIDS process, I didn't see an act of destruction; I saw an opportunity for a profound transformation.

My career, from my time leading the U.S. Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF) in a combat zone to my work today, has been a master class in the painful realities of defense acquisition. The current system is a leviathan, built to generate a long list of requirements and a detailed plan for the "perfect" solution. It is a system that believes perfection can be found on a timeline measured in decades, not weeks. The result is a slow, methodical march toward obsolescence.

There will be those who warn of the immense cost of tearing down and replacing a system as entrenched as JCIDS—formally, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, established in 2003 and most recently updated four years ago to centralize the development of requirements and metrics for the military’s acquisition efforts. They will point to the price tag of a new bureaucracy, the inevitable friction, and the risk of program disruptions. But we must weigh that against the far more catastrophic price of the status quo. The DoD's own reports have documented numerous "cost overruns," and while these financial burdens are significant, they are not the true measure of failure. The real cost of delay is not counted in dollars, but in lives. Every day a soldier waits for a critical piece of equipment is a day that increases the risk to a warfighter on the battlefield. As a former colleague and I once wrote, "Lives depend on our ability to rapidly recognize and address changes in the battlefield environment." The cost of doing nothing is the cost of losing the next war.

We have a choice to make. We can continue a process that produces beautifully documented requirements for technology that is often out-of-date before it even reaches the hands of a soldier, or we can embrace a new methodology. The fundamental shift must be this: stop obsessing over requirements and start solving problems.

At the REF, we had to move at the speed of war, not the speed of bureaucracy. The enemy wasn't consulting a committee to approve their next improvised explosive device. So we couldn't wait for a "100-percent solution." Instead, we adopted a standard of the "51 percent solution." If a piece of equipment met just over half of its desired performance requirements, and it could get to the warfighter in time to save a life or achieve a mission, we considered it a success. We would then iterate and improve. This isn't about accepting mediocrity; it's about prioritizing speed and impact over a perfect, yet delayed, delivery. The bureaucracy always gets a vote, but it shouldn't get a veto on our ability to solve problems on the battlefield.

My team and I built a repeatable model around this idea. We curated problems directly from the end user, and we engaged an ecosystem of innovators to help solve them. This approach became the foundation for the "Hacking for Defense" program, which we co-founded at Stanford 10 years ago. We took real, mission-critical problems from the Defense Department  and U.S. intelligence community and challenged student teams to solve them using the "Lean Startup" methodology. Instead of producing more reports and glossy presentations, these teams were required to build prototypes and deliver working code.

The results have been astonishing. We've seen student ventures grow into successful companies that are delivering cutting-edge technology to the national security community, from flexible batteries for warfighters to constellations of satellites. These are companies that would have likely never entered the traditional defense contracting world. Why? Because the Pentagon’s greatest value proposition to the tech world isn't its money—it’s its problems. By clearly articulating our most challenging mission needs, we can attract the best talent in the world to help us solve them.

The Secretary’s announcement is a call to action. It is a chance to fundamentally change our culture from one that values procedural compliance to one that champions ingenuity and results. This isn't just about tweaking a process; it's about embracing a new operating model for the 21st century. By focusing on real-world problems and empowering our people to find and deploy solutions with speed and urgency, we can ensure that our military remains the most capable in the world. It’s time to stop writing requirements and start solving problems.

Peter Newell, a retired Army colonel, is CEO of BMNT and a former director of the Army's Rapid Equipping Force.

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After President Trump’s high-level meeting at the White House last week with President Zelenskyy and several European leaders, attention has turned to what security guarantees for Ukraine might look like if a peace deal is reached. Ukraine remains understandably wary of assurances that sound strong on paper but prove meaningless in practice. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum—under which Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for promises later violated by Russia in 2014—remains a cautionary tale.

The most effective way to guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security is NATO membership. But in the short term, President Trump has repeatedly stated that he does not support this idea, nor will he agree to U.S. troops on Ukrainian soil. With this political reality in mind, policymakers should consider a layered approach to guaranteeing Ukraine’s security. No single measure is sufficient, but together they would provide the most robust protection currently possible.

The first step would be to establish a civilian monitoring mission that can patrol both sides of a line of occupation, should a peace agreement leave Russian troops on Ukrainian soil. For credibility, it would need to be led by an organization that both Ukraine and Russia could accept. The Organization of Turkic States or the Gulf Cooperation Council might be viable options, as both aspire to play larger geopolitical roles. While such a mission would not resolve all disputes, it could help stabilize a fragile ceasefire and reduce the risk of renewed hostilities.

The second element would be the creation of a European coalition of the willing—that is, European governments willing to send troops to Ukraine to serve as a deterrent and as a visible demonstration of their commitment to its sovereignty. Several countries, including the UK, France, Canada, and Türkiye, have suggested they could contribute forces. Deployments could be rotational, positioned away from the line of occupation but along likely (future) invasion routes. In addition, the coalition should establish an air policing mission to secure Ukraine’s skies, operating from bases in Poland and Romania. Maritime patrols in the Black Sea would also be essential. A secure and open Black Sea is vital not only for Ukraine’s economy but also for broader regional stability.

The third layer involves America. Even without U.S. troops in Ukraine, Washington can still play an indispensable part. The U.S. should provide “over-the-horizon” capabilities such as air-to-air refueling, intelligence sharing, and air and naval patrols to support Europe’s coalition. Pre-positioning U.S. forces outside Ukraine for potential rapid deployment would further enhance deterrence. The U.S. should also restart the National Guard State Partnership Program with Ukraine. Since 1993, the California National Guard has worked with Ukraine through the SPP to improve military interoperability. But these efforts have been on hold since 2022. Policymakers should revive this program to deepen US-Ukraine military relations.

Another important area is defense industrial cooperation. The war has accelerated Ukraine’s defense sector, particularly in unmanned systems. Closer cooperation would give American companies access to cutting-edge innovation while strengthening Ukraine’s domestic capacity. 

Above all, U.S. military assistance must continue even after a peace deal. The Ukrainian Armed Forces will ultimately be the main guarantor of the country’s security, and Russia will almost certainly use any pause to rearm. It is in America’s interest to ensure Ukraine remains resilient and capable.

A fourth layer should involve deepening Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic engagement. While NATO membership may not be possible now and Ukraine’s EU accession process will be lengthy, practical steps should be taken to bring Ukraine closer. NATO could establish a Center of Excellence on Modern Warfare in Ukraine, helping allies to learn from Kyiv’s battlefield experience. Ukraine could once again contribute to the NATO Response Force, boosting interoperability without requiring an alliance footprint inside the country. Every NATO summit should include a session of the NATO-Ukraine Council, and Ukraine should be invited as an observer to other high-level meetings when appropriate. Such measures would institutionalize Ukraine’s place in the Euro-Atlantic family while keeping the door open for eventual membership. Finally, NATO is unlikely to approve any mission to train Ukrainian forces, whether inside or outside of their home country. But the European Union could step in under its Common Security and Defense Policy framework. A joint EU-Ukraine training operation at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center in western Ukraine would carry important symbolic and practical value, even if modest in size.

The final layer requires strengthening NATO’s eastern front. While these measures may not directly guarantee Ukraine’s security, they are essential for regional stability and for reinforcing NATO’s deterrence posture. Even after peace talks, history suggests that Russia will continue to threaten Eastern Europe. NATO should maintain its enhanced forward presence, and serious consideration should be given to a greater role for Poland in nuclear burden-sharing. For decades, several NATO members have hosted U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs and operated dual-capable aircraft that can deliver them. Adding Poland to this group would send a powerful message of deterrence. Equally important is sustaining U.S. troop levels in Europe. Policymakers should resist the temptation to interpret a ceasefire as a reason for drawdowns. Past withdrawals have only emboldened aggressors. 

With the right vision, political courage, and statecraft, President Trump has the opportunity to shape an outcome that secures his legacy as a peacemaker but also ensures the long-term security of Ukraine and the wider transatlantic community. A layered approach to security guarantees, while imperfect, offers the best path forward until Ukraine can take its rightful place as a full member of NATO.

Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

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